Rethinking Democratization in the Philippines: Elections, Political Families, and Parties 59 A major contentious issue about the PL system is whether to limit its implementation only to parties and organizations of citizens belonging to “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors as provided for in Section 2 of RA 7941. In the landmark case, Ang Bagong Bayani et al., vs. Comelec, the Supreme Court ruled in 2001 that the party-list system is exclusively for parties and organizations representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. In practice, however, the Comelec has exercised a lot of leeway in implementing the law and allowed the participation of several parties and individuals whose credentials will not pass a strict rendering of the court's ruling. Alarmed by this development, former Supreme Court Chief Justice, Reynato Puno, asserted in his dissenting opinion in BANAT et al. vs Comelec (2009) that allowing major political parties to participate in the party list process “will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray the democratic spirit of the constitution”. However, in another recent landmark case, Atong Paglaum et al., vs. Comelec, the Supreme Court in 2013 ruled that national or regional parties participating in the PL system need not represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector” and that sectoral parties may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-dened constituencies”. In effect, the latest ruling in 2013 overturns the overall spirit of the earlier Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT cases which sought to require parties and organizations participating in the PL system to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. The actual implementation of the PL system has resulted in an extreme fragmentation of the political parties running under this system. This has exacerbated the problems of a divided government and the aggregation of interests in a presidential system with weak parties to begin with. The PL law elects candidates under a system of proportional representation but imposes at the same time a 3-seat cap and a 2 percent minimum vote threshold for winning candidates. To ll up the constitutionally mandated 20 percent seats in the House of Representatives for PL parties, the Supreme Court decision on April 21, 2009 (BANAT et al. vs. Comelec) declared as unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party list seats but retained the threeseat cap for each winning party. The Supreme Court justies the retention of the three-seat cap as a “valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party list elections” but this fear has no empirical basis. For instance, in the last four elections , no party has received more than 11 percent of the total votes cast for the party list as shown in the following results by rst ranked parties: 2001, Bayan Muna, 11%; 2004, Bayan Muna, 9%; 2007, BUHAY, 7%; and 2010, AKO Bicol Political Party, 4%. Moreover, the aggregate votes cast for the single largest bloc of party list organizations (Makabayan) comprising Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis, Gabriela, Kabataan, and Act Teachers also do not exceed 10 percent of the total votes cast for the PL system. But at the same time, parties that do well in the party list system are always penalized by the three-