66. New Zealand is a small country and lacks the necessary level of resources, infrastructure and service demand to justify an entity on the scale of Anderson’s ISIC model. Our current oversight regime is far more minimal in terms of personnel and institutional scope than the UK’s incumbent model. Notwithstanding these inherent limitations, the notion of an independent Intelligence and Security Commission consisting of judicial commissioners that places the current Inspector-General and Commissioner for Security Warrants functions under one roof has some merit. 67. Such an approach may work to improve the institutional strength, scope and independence of New Zealand’s oversight regime. This approach would also complement a more integrated or unified legislative framework and the development of a statutory Code of Practice. Part B: RECOMMENDATIONS – Oversight mechanisms g. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers investigate current and potential measures which enable oversight mechanisms to assess intelligence and security practices against New Zealand’s domestic and international rights obligations. h. The Reviewers investigate the implications of consolidating current oversight roles and functions into an independent centralised judicial entity such as an Intelligence and Security Commission David Rutherford Chief Commissioner Page 93 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR