concern that the 2013 amendments did not establish an oversight regime sufficient to assure the public that appropriate scrutiny and supervision will occur.52 61. In the UK, the Anderson report has recommended the consolidation of three independent oversight entities into one centralized Commission, entitled the Independent Surveillance and Intelligence Commission (ISIC). The ISIC model proposed by Anderson merges a number of judicial and bureaucratic functions together under the same roof, including:     Warrant oversight and authorisation (to be undertaken by Judicial Commissioners) Capacity to carry out own-motion inquiries Review and monitoring Audit and inspection of intelligence and security services 62. Anderson proposes that the strong, centralized ISIC model brings a number of advantages due to its greater size and unified nature. This includes having much broader monitoring and investigation capabilities and a greater public profile. 53 63. The IRS Panel has similarly recommended that a consolidated approach is taken through the creation of a National Intelligence and Surveillance Office (NISO). However, unlike Anderson’s proposal, the Judicial Commissioners who authorise and oversee that warrant process remain independent from the NISO54. 64. The ISR Panel notes that a clear oversight regime is an essential aspect of maintaining public trust and confidence in intelligence and security services. Complex, obscure legal frameworks and institutions do not tend to serve the public well as they are difficult for the public to identify and access.55 65. The Commission considers that the strong, centralised institutional models envisaged in the ISIC and NISO models ought to be considered for adaptation in New Zealand. The Commission considers that the current “sole office-holder” approach taken in New Zealand risks having insufficient capacity to undertake a suitably broad range of oversight functions56. 52 Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, para 42, p 11 A Question of Trust, para 14.97 54 A Democratic License to Operate, Recommendations 17-19, p xviii 55 ibid para 4.42-4.43 56 see also Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, p 7, para 29 53 Page 92 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR