ICESCR; it has had Special Rapporteurs named to study particular rights; and it has held “days of general discussion” on individual rights. A third response has been to address justiciability arguments based on cost and positive nature by clarifying the nature of State obligations under the Covenant. In its General Comment No.3, the Committee defined them as comprising obligations to take steps towards realizing the rights (albeit progressively), to avoid any unjustifiable backsliding (i.e. deliberately regressive measures) in their realization, and to assume a minimum core obligation in regard to each right. The Committee has also endorsed a “typology” of State obligations which disaggregates them into (1) the obligation to respect (i.e. to refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals), (2) the obligation to protect (i.e. to protect individuals from interference with their rights by others), and (3) the obligation to fulfill (i.e. to provide the object of the right, such as adequate food or housing etc.). This well-known typology goes some way to responding to objections of justiciability: an obligation to respect is essentially negative in nature and does not require the use of State resources, an obligation to protect might require State action (such as adopting legislation) but does not place undue strain on State resources; it is only the obligation to fulfill that raises the two obligations – costliness and positive nature – most acutely.