Rethinking Democratization in the Philippines: Elections, Political Families, and Parties 45 In his summation of twenty ve years of comparative transition processes away from authoritarian rule, Schmitter argues: “Of all the economic and cultural prerequisites or preconditions of democracy, the one that must command the most urgent attention is the need for prior agreement on national identity and borders” (2010: 25). Indeed, the urgency of addressing this problem is tragically demonstrated by the failure of government to come to terms with the historic afrmation of the national identity and geographic community of Muslims in the country. Under the Aquino II administration, a formal peace agreement between the government and the largest Muslim armed contingent had been aborted with the failure of Congress to formally pass a law creating a new autonomous Muslim region.3 In another related level of contested national identity rooted on questions of class equality and solidarity, the protracted armed struggle by Communist-led guerrillas in the country likewise attests to the urgency of this problem. The failure of various administrations during the transition process to decisively resolve these legitimate issues does not speak well of its capabilities and priorities. Another lingering outcome of both the dictatorship and the transition process has been a politicized military. For obvious reasons, no process of democratization can proceed if the military continues to defy legitimate civilian authority. But its politicization as an institution does not take place independently of its relations with civilian authorities. In short, military (and police) tendencies towards politicization are usually driven by perceptions about the illegitimacy and continuing incompetence of civilian leaders. Moreover, civilian machinations for the pursuit of power and wealth also enlist military allies, further politicizing the institution. Not surprisingly, the most dangerous displays of military rebelliousness during the transition process also took place during the administration of civilian leaders seen as illegitimate and corrupt. In recent years, the electoral process has served as a convenient safety valve for rechanneling and absorbing the political militancy of rebellious units and ofcers. However, this relative stability can be easily undermined by crisis situations provoked by the perceived ineptness of civilian leaders and their military accomplices as dramatized by the restiveness of some police units and ofcers in the aftermath of the Mamasapano encounter. Thus, the long term response to the dangers of a politicized military lies not so much in reforms within the institution, although these are important, as in reforms in the civilian institutions that direct and legitimize the military's activities. A major failing of the transition process has been its inability to improve the process of electoral governance in the country. Both procedural and substantive approaches to democracy agree that credible electoral exercises are necessary conditions for the initiation and maintenance of democratic regimes. Our elections continue to suffer from endemic violence and fraudulent manipulations. Moreover, free and fair elections cannot be assured as long as many areas of the country remain as arenas of armed conict and signicant numbers of voters are in effect disenfranchised by their poverty and