58 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Second Edition members to continue contesting elections. The separate election of the president and the vice-president, instead of being chosen as a team representing the same party, also weakens the process of party building. Moreover, the present system of electing senators as individuals rather than as a team representing political parties with coherent policies and programs encourages intra-party competition among the party members particularly for the hotly contested tail-end positions. Do synchronized elections, as mandated by R.A. 7166 and implemented since 1992, lead to more efcient governments and stable parties? There are at least two contrasting views on this matter. One view argues that such elections “weaken party links between national and local candidates” as each set of leaders focus on ghting their own electoral battles at the expense of greater party unity and coherence (Velasco 2006: 100). A related view also agrees that synchronized elections are detrimental to party formation since “it puts a lot of premium on name recognition and recall rather than issue positions” (Manacsa and Tan 2005: 757). Sartori explains that synchronized and staggered elections have their own strength and weakness. He points out that staggered elections “keep the polity in tune with shifts in popular opinion and enhance the responsiveness of politicians” but it also makes the construction of legislative majorities more difcult to satisfy (1997: 178-9). He adds that synchronized or simultaneous elections allow for the easier construction of majority blocs and concludes that if the priority is for “performing and responsible governments”, then synchronized elections should be favored (1997: 179). However, in the Philippine context with its weak legislature vis-à-vis the presidency and weak party system, the construction of “legislative majorities” is derived not so much from elections but from the post-electoral realignments that normally follow the election of a new president. Such presidential-driven party realignments dictated by legislators' desire to have easy access to the enormous resources and perks of the presidency naturally further weaken the party system. The Party List Electoral System A major electoral institutional innovation of the 1987 constitution concerns the Party List (PL) system. This paper will concern itself with major issues that have not been well addressed in existing studies about the PL system.24 The enabling law for the Party-List electoral system, Republic Act 7941, was passed in 1995 and rst implemented in 1998.25 Under the constitution 20 percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives is allocated for the party list system. Together with this 20 percent total seat allocation mandated by the constitution, the enabling law also imposed a two percent minimum threshold for a party list organization to have an elected representative; a three-seat maximum representation for any PL organization; and a system of proportional representation for determining the actual number of seats assigned to those parties that meet the minimum vote threshold.