136 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Second Edition municipali es declined as a result of the conversion of 11 municipali es into ci es, while the number of barangays was reduced. Retrieved from h p://www.newsbreak.ph /2007/08/22/gma-crea ng-too-many-lgus/. 19 Manasan 2009. Manasan argues that the LGC tax assignment scores low in terms of the autonomy criterion as it “seriously limits their power to set tax rates…(as).. the Code fixes the tax rate for some types of taxes like the SEF real property tax rate, and the community tax… the maximum allowable rates appear to be too low. …(and) the Code mandates that tax rates can only beadjusted once in 5 years and by no more than 10 percent.” 20 Data from the Department of Finance—Bureau of Local Government Finance website. h p://blgf.gov.ph/lgu-fiscal-data/ 21 As cited in h p://phildevfinance.posterous.com/there-will-be-more-provinces-imposingthe-idl. 22 h p://www.dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/issuances/joint_circulars/DILG-Joint_Circulars20101027-8695fc59c5.pdf 23 These cases, of Nueva Ecija spending 65 centavos more for every peso collected from real property taxes or of Quezon City a aching the property of machinery to increase the tax to be collected from proper es improved, were cited in the World Bank-Asian Development Bank, Decentraliza on in the Philippines: strengthening local government financing and resource management in the short-term (May 2005). From h p://pdf.ph/downloads/decentraliza on /Study%20on%20Decentraliza on%20 (Strengthening%20LGU%20Financing).pdf We should add here that the level of idle land tax should be higher than the statutory ceiling of 5% inasmuch as the assessed value of agricultural lands alone are low. 24 To counter the monopolis c, budget-maximizing local poli cians and bureaucrats, strategies to improve accountability and transparency should be set in place. 25 The document notes that, at both the local and the na onal level, the subjuga on of public administra on has led to (i) a loss of civil service status and morale, (ii) a complex and enduring web of connec ons between poli cal execu ves, civil servants, and business interests, (iii) drama c and turbulent changes during the transi on from one administra on to another and the ins tu onaliza on of 'courtesy resigna ons' at transi on, (iv) a blurring of the dis nc on between career and non-career officials, and (v) civil servants' own inability and unwillingness to use the protec on of the laws. 26 Hutchcro characterizes the Philippines as a patrimonial oligarchic state. It is important to heed one of his observa ons that “piecemeal reforms are o en inhibited both by the lack of bureaucra c coherence and by the tremendous power of oligarchic interests.” Although there are clearly instances when regimes might benefit by selec ve measures of reform, there has been li le assurance that the weak bureaucracy can implement them over the objec ons of various entrenched interests long accustomed to par cularis c plunder of the state apparatus. 27 Several studies have examined the factors that brought forth exemplary local governance and the par cipa on of civil society organiza ons in Naga City. Takeshi Kawanaka analyzed the factors that led to innova ons in Naga City (Power in a Philippine city, IDE Occasional Paper Series. 2002). Racelis ('Anxie es and affirma ons: NGO–Donor partnerships for social transforma on', in Bebbington, Anthony J. et.al, Can NGOs make a difference: the challenge of development alterna ves. 2008. Pp. 205-208), documents a case of a collabora ve engagement between an urban poor federa on, the Naga City government, and the World Bank. The case provides evidence of the strength of civil society in Naga City, specifically the Naga City Urban Poor Federa ons, Inc. and its NGO partner, the Community Organiza on of the Philippines Enterprise Founda on (COPE). 28 Joel Rocamora, Email response to emailed ques ons. February 7, 2011.