Philippine Democratization: Summing-up Key Conceptual, Institutional, and Developmental Issues 251 legislatures made up of individuals parochially elected and representing localized district interests. This problem is aggravated by the absence of a strong party system which further empowers the president to act, in effect, as the sole aggregator of the national policy agenda with little input from parties and other organized political groupings. As Ronas points out, an alternative response to an overly strong president is to strengthen the powers of the legislature, otherwise the presidency loses its accountability to the assembly and magnies the risks of presidential power being abused. For instance at the height of its exercise of presidential powers, the Arroyo administration sought to exempt its executive ofcials from the investigative and monitoring functions of Congress. Another complementary check to a president with too much power is a party system with enough legitimacy and strength to challenge and provide a broader base of consensus to presidential initiatives. Thus, a well institutionalized and disciplined party system can provide an expanded venue for policy-making and consensus which otherwise would be overwhelmingly dominated by the president. In exploring further some reform measures to advance the cause of horizontal accountability, Ronas cautions against grand projects designed to amend the constitution for major institutional changes such as the shift to a federal-parliamentary system. He argues that these are inherently divisive measures with potentially more harmful unintended consequences. Instead, he focuses on more pragmatic and doable and yet consequential measures such as restoring to Congress the power over the purse (budgeting process), the strengthening of the rules and powers of LEDAC (Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council) and JELACC (Judicial Executive Legislative Advisory and Consultative Council), and ensuring the scal autonomy of the Judiciary. Another important area for reform is to strengthen local government units as a counterfoil to the overconcentration of powers in the executive and its national agencies. However, this can be done not necessarily by an outright shift to a federal system, with all its unintended consequences. An alternative approach can simply build on the existing Local Government Code, amending key provisions to strengthen peoples' participation in governing councils and upgrading the organizational and administrative capabilities of local ofcials and personnel. However, well chosen amendments to the existing constitution may be worth exploring to address unique problems such as the possibility of institutionalizing a system of asymmetric federalism for the Muslim dominated provinces of Mindanao. Indeed, these are reform areas where the leadership of a strong president could be tested: not in the exercise of overwhelming power over Congress and the Judiciary but in the exercise of negotiating skills for welfare-enhancing distributive reforms. As Boix asserts: