196 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Second Edition their built-in, undemocratic advantages – which is non-violent, per se – but also by the use of fraud and force – the violent and extra-legal form used against non-traditional and progressive forces.14 Elections: Charade Meantime, the resiliency and longevity of political dynasties in the Philippines can be attributed to the electoral advantages they have over nondynastic aspirants for public ofce. Dynastic politicians inherit the political machines, connections, resources, and kinship networks of their ancestors. They also enjoy the advantage of name recognition built by years and decades of dynastic political power. Aside from name recall, voting is largely inuenced by personal ties, clientilism, and patronage instead of public policy preferences or ideology.15 Personality-oriented elections where many voters elect individual candidates rather than party platforms are not conducive for the development of a functional political party system. A typical voter chooses his candidates coming from an array of political parties and coalitions, including the ruling party or coalition which shows no platform differences except campaign slogans. Traditional political parties are mere campaign machines built around personalities or popular leaders of political families and, having been established primarily for election goals, they hardly function as one after every election. Politicians running for a national or local position join political parties out of political convenience. Opportunism, “turncoatism” or party-switching is the norm. Politicians gravitate toward or switch allegiance to the party or coalition of the winning president to gain access to pork barrel and other political favors. Except for some groups in the Party-list system, none of the dynastic political parties can qualify for meeting the basic requirements of a real political party such as a vision or ideology, strategic programs, policy alternatives, and a party organization of cadres and mass members bound together by a system of party discipline. Thus it comes as no surprise when members of a political party may vie for the same position or support candidates coming from rival political groups. Neither the electoral advantages of political dynasties nor the lack of functional political parties can of course be regulated let alone reined in by the electoral management body, the Comelec. A creation of the Commonwealth transition period during the late 1930s, this constitutional commission – powerful as it may seem - lacks the political autonomy and the competence to ensure fair and credible elections. The election body's weaknesses can be explained by the fact that its members are appointed by the president often as a political reward thus making them vulnerable to compromise vis-à-vis the partisan interests of the appointing authority and other inuential forces or, at the very least, putting their independence under a cloud of doubt. Political elites maintain patronage politics with the Comelec at the national and local