undertake active support to AFP on counter-insurgency measures and other serious threats to national security utilizing armed CVOs, and authorized the allocation of local funds to sustain these groups. 64. CVOs, using EO 546 as a legitimate cover, became private militias of local politicians and business interests to which various HR abuses have been attributed. The infamous Ampatuan Massacre brought to fore how EO 546 could be employed for HR abuses. The murder of 58 people, mostly journalists, was committed by a powerful political clan with the aid of CAFGUs and CVOs, as EO 546 justified the maintenance of a militia.65 65. Indictment of EO 546 was massive in the domestic and even international community. Thus, when then-Sen. Benigno Aquino III campaigned for the presidency in 2010, one of his major promises was to revoke EO 546.66 However, he announced in November 2010 that his administration would professionalize the paramilitary groups, as disbanding them was not the solution.67 66. In the wake of insurgent attacks on mining operations, Pres. Aquino announced in October 2011 that “employing paramilitary units like CAFGUs is a viable solution to the lack of soldiers and policemen as the government cannot afford to hire more police and military personnel because their pensions would be a burden to the national coffers.”68 67. Pres. Aquino approved the AFP’s proposal to organize paramilitary groups into Special CAFGU Active Auxiliary units (SCAAs) to augment the security forces of the said firms, a decision occasioned by lack of military resources to protect investments.69 The SCAAs would be organized, funded, and directed by the mining companies for deployment in areas of major mining operations.70 Their allowances would be shouldered by the private companies that use their services to secure private investments.71 68. As things now stand, both the CAFGUs and CVOs as armed auxiliary forces are State-sanctioned and organized, and are provided weapons from government arsenals. Within the CAFGU are privately raised and organized groups or professionalized paramilitaries, armed and trained by the State, to serve what are undoubtedly private business interests. 65 Rommel C. Banlaoi, CAFGUs, CVOs and The Maguindanao Massacre, 6 AUTONOMY & PEACE REVIEW 61, 69-71 (March 2010), accessed from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20657-1522-1-30.pdf?110128055929; Human Rights Watch, Philippines: No Progress Disarming, Demobilizing Militias, 21 November 2012, accessed from https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/21/ philippines-no-progress-disarming-demobilizing-militias; See also, Rappler, Aquino urged to revoke order on civilian militias, 22 November 2012, accessed from http://www.rappler.com/nation/16561-aquino-urged-to-revoke-order-on-civilian-militias. 66 See HRW, Id. 67 Id. 68 Jam Sisante, Aquino thumbs down abolition of militia forces, GMA Network News, November 23, 2010, available at http:// www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/206685/news/nation/aquino-thumbs-down-abolition-of-militia-forces, 69 Id. 70 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Philippine Army, Facts about CAFGUs in Cadre Need to Know on CAA Administration, at 25, http://www.army.mil.ph/Good%20Governance%20Conditions/cafgu/Cadre_Need_to_Know_on_CAA_ Administration.pdf. 71 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Philippine Army, Facts about CAFGUs in Cadre Need to Know on CAA Administration, at 25, http://www.army.mil.ph/Good%20Governance%20Conditions/cafgu/Cadre_Need_to_Know_on_CAA_ Administration.pdf. 16