4 the RomeStatute, which makes R.A. No. 9851 more useful for the Philippines where internal, rather than international, armed conflicts have been more relevant for quite some time now. But of course international armed conflict is also currently relevant to the Philippines, albeit mainly through its participation in various peace-keeping missions andforces. The difference between R.A. No. 9851 and the RomeStatute in terms of more war crimes applicable to internal armed conflict can be attributed to some guidance from the landmark three volume 2005 ICRC highly authoritative study on customary IHL, its rules and state practice, in which some University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law professors and students had participated - among them Brod Raul Perhaps the most significant finding or result of this study is that 146 of the 161 determined rules of customary THL apply to both international and non-international armed conflict, thus expanding significantly the rules applicableto internal armed conflict, well beyond thosein the 1977 Additional ProtocolII. Speaking of internal armedconflict, it is clear that for war crimes, genocide and “other crimes against humanity” under R.A. No. 9851, the perpetrators who may be held accountable for these serious international crimesare not limited to state agents and may include non-state actors — whichis in accordancewith thefactual reality. Of course,liability is based on individual criminal responsibility of natural. not juridical, persons. But as we shall discuss shortly, there is also a form of commandresponsibility. We can note the role of “State or organizational policy” when it comesto “other crimes against humanity” andthe role of “a State ora political organization” when it comesto enforced or involuntary disappearanceof personsas part oF “other crimes against humanity.” In other words, there are also individual leaders or commandersofcertain organizations, whether state or non-state, who would be responsible for certain organizational policies or decisions that result in these crimes. Torture and Enforced Disappearance: Questions ofDefinition It will be noted that the specific act of torture is mentioned under warcrimes and “other crimes against humanity” in R.A. No. 9851, while the specific act of enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons is mentioned under“other crimes against humanity” therein. Both acts are defined in this new law. Here “torture” is defined as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical, mental, or psychological. upon a person in the custody or underthe control of the accused.” Quite significantly, unlike the definition of torture in the likewise new butslightly older R.A. No. 9745 (“Anti-Torture Act of 2009”), there are no qualifications as to perpetrator (“inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescenceof a2 person in authority or agent of a person in authority”) and as to purpose (“for such purposes as obtaining from him/heror a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/sheor a third person has committedor is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/herora third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind”). Clearly, the definition of “torture” in R.A. No. 9851 is of much wider application (inc. to non-state actors) that that in R.A. No. 9745. Surely, this is a less than idealsituation of two Philippine statutes having two different definitions of torture, even if these are applied to twodifferent situations: torture per se (apply R.A. No. 9745 andits definition and torture as part of war crimes or “other crimes against humanity” (apply R.A. No. 9851 andits definition). Eventually, those definitions will have to be harmonized one way or the other. The “root cause” of this discrepancy lies in the definition models used by R.A. No. 9745 and by R.A. No. 9851, respectively, namely the different definitions of torture in the 1984 Convention Against Torture and in the 1998 RomeStatute. Interestingly, a new HouseBill No. 7199 wasfiled by Anak Mindanao Rep. Ariel Caringal Hernandez only last February 22 seeking the amendmentof R.A. No. 9745, so that its definition of torture and consequent application are not limited to state-agent perpetrators andtheir victims. And for this purpose, the amendatory bill invokes and adopts R.A. No. 9851’s definition of torture. That kind of discrepancy regarding the definition of torture could be “replayed” when it comesto still another new humanrights and IHL-related law,that on enforced disappearance. In R.A. No. 9851, “enforced or involuntary disappearanceof persons” is defined as “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom orto give information on the fate or whereaboutsof those persons, with the intention of removing them from theprotection of the law for a prolongedperiodof time.” Note “State ora political organization,” with the latter clearly indicating that this could be perpetrated by a non-state armed group. This was modeledon thedefinition of “enforced disappearance of persons” in the RomeStatute. The pending bills in Congress for an “Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act,” however. invariably carry the qualification “committed by government authorities or by personsor groupsof personsacting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of such person in authority” — in short, state agents. This is modeled on thedefinition of “enforced disappearance” in the 2006 International Conventionfor the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. It remains to be seen how an “Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act”will take final shape in its definition of the crime, given the already existing definition in R.A. No. 9851.