The Never Ending Democratization of the Philippines 93 only to decrease the budget proposed by the President. The moment Congress approves the national appropriations law, the President takes over its execution. Congress does not share this power with the executive. In implementing the approved budget, the President exercises line-item veto, realignment of the budget, and build up reserves. Here we see that the President has encroached on the House of Representatives' power over the purse. This encroachment, formalized during the authoritarian rule of Marcos, endures in the Revised Administrative Code and other statutes (Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009). The release of the legislators' Development Fund, more commonly called the pork barrel, is also subject to the approval of the President. It has been publicly admitted by congressmen, particularly those from the opposition, that their share of the development fund had been withheld by the President. This has been a compelling reason why legislators switch party afliation whenever a new President is elected and assumes the presidency (see Kasuya 2009). This is an essential aspect of what has been called the politics of patronage. The politics of patronage disperses the limited budget of the national government too thinly. The wide discretion enjoyed by legislators aligned with the executive in the implementation of their development fund presents the opportunity for corruption (Martinez 1999: 4) Former Senate President Ernesto Maceda in his column for the Philippine Star stated that “it has been known for decades that the pork barrel funds are a major source of corruption here and in the United States” (Maceda, December 23, 2010). In his listing of the sources of pork barrel, the funds come from “the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), the Road Users Tax fund, and other congressional insertions” (Maceda Ibid.). The pork barrel may be explicit or embedded in the budget of Department of Public Works and Highways and Department of Transportation and Communication (Philippine Human development Report: 39). The highest levels of pork barrel occurred in the election years of 2004 and 2007, P8.3 billion and P11.4 billion respectively (Ibid.) Maceda says that the budget for 2011 had increased the pork barrel for elective national ofcials. He lists them as follows: “For the President – P12 billion in addition to the Pagcor Social Fund, the contingent fund, and PCSO funD For the vice-President – P200 million For the senators – P200 million plus P100 million on insertions plus P15 million each for the Members of the Commission on Appointments (CA) For Congressmen – P70 million plus P50 million per congressional district from the DPWH funds plus P15 million for CA members”. He also listed the sources of pork barrel for governors, vice-governors, mayors, vice-mayors councilors.