resettlement process and promote in-city resettlement outcomes. 94 Even in the context of Metro Manila, LGUs are at least in principle more in touch with the issues that affect security of tenure in their local community. For instance, the dynamic of land issues in highly urbanised Makati is entirely different from the largely suburban LGUs of Caloocan and Muntinlupa. However, the decentralised nature of the framework can also inhibit participation and the enjoyment of human rights by allowing local government to avoid compliance with the law in favour of more politically successful strategies. This problem is compounded in the situation of resettlement outside a particular LGU’s jurisdiction. While implementation can work effectively where an entire eviction and resettlement programme takes place in a single municipality, if a community is to be moved to another LGU then there is significant potential for conflict and problems with coordination among the different local governments involved. Decentralisation is not of itself adverse to the effective enjoyment of human rights. If LGUs are provided with adequate technical assistance from specialised national housing agencies they will be able to develop and implement programmes more efficiently. Nonetheless, a decentralised institutional architecture requires extensive safeguards to ensure localised power structures are kept in check, while balancing the provision of independence to LGUs to innovate in the development of localised policy initiatives during evictions and resettlement. The devolution of the ‘clearing house’ function on evictions is one prominent barrier to effective decentralisation in the context of human rights protections. LGUs are often directly involved in all aspects of evictions and resettlement, or at least play a central role in facilitating the process in coordination with national urban development agencies. Such an active and central actor in the eviction and resettlement process should not be entrusted with an independent monitoring and compliance-review function, as currently exists in the provision of certificates of compliance by the local housing boards. Evidence clearly suggests that LHBs are unable to perform this function to a satisfactory standard. The Philippine NGO Urban Poor Associates has reported that 81% of evictions in 2012 proceeded illegally without any certificate of compliance provided by responsible local administrators.95 The composition of LHBs, which are comprised predominantly of local politicians or LGU officials, allows the political sympathies of senior local officials to influence proceedings and the provision of the certificate of compliance. This conflict of interest must be rectified by removing the monitoring and compliance-review function from LHBs and transferring it to an independent, preferably national, body. This does not mean that LHBs should be disbanded, as they can and should still remain as a vehicle for the development of localised policy initiatives and community participation in governance. HUDCC’s Guidebook for Local Housing specifies a wide range of programmatic functions that LHBs should undertake that are entirely separate from evictions and resettlement monitoring. 96 As identified by UN-HABITAT, a stronger connection between the national housing architecture and LGUs is likely to improve the quality of housing programmes in local communities.97 However, LGUs cannot be 94 See: UN-HABITAT, Innovative Tenure in the Philippines: Challenges, Approaches and Institutionalization, 2012, p. 44. Urban Poor Associates, Eviction Monitor 2012: Annual Report, 2012, p. 1. 96 Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, LGU’s Guidebook for Local Housing Project/Program, 2009, pp. 8-10. 97 UN-HABITAT, Innovative Tenure in the Philippines: Challenges, Approaches and Institutionalization, 2012, pp. 44-47. 95 57