without direct contact with or interviews of migrant fishers. This approach fails to comprehensively assess the services agencies provide to migrant workers or uncover issues such as deception or coercion by the agencies. As long as the businesses provide well-done documentation with signatures from both fishers and employers, they receive high evaluation scores. Consequently, evaluation scores are often high. Even when serious violations are found and government imposes suspensions on certain agencies, their founder can continue to operate by registering new companies under their family members' names, allowing poor practices to persist. The NHRC therefore recommends that the evaluation procedures establish a formal system for involving civil society organizations, incorporating the participation of trade unions and migrant workers themselves. Strict requirements should also be set for evaluation committee members to adhere to rules preventing conflict of interest. It is even more challenging to ensure proper recruitment procedures when agencies are located abroad, in the migrant fishers’ origin country. A model to consider is the collaboration between the TTLA and the TSSFA, which has established labor cooperation channels with Indonesian trade unions. Since direct hiring cannot currently be done due to legal constraints in both countries, Indonesian recruitment agencies, working with Taiwanese agencies, handle the process. The unions work through SPPI, which provides a complete recruitment, training, boarding, and repatriation service. By establishing cooperative channels, these efforts can further improve human rights protections. The government should collaborate with local trade unions and related organizations in origin countries to prevent exploitation by foreign agencies and enhance protections for foreign migrant fishers. (4) Provide onshore living facilities to safeguard workers’ 130