Rethinking Democratization in the Philippines 187 In the overall system of the public accountability of officials in a democratic regime, elections constitute the process of “vertical accountability” when citizens are enabled to choose their officials in “free, fair, and competitive” contests. O'Donnell reminds us that elections “…occur only periodically, and their effectiveness at securing vertical account-ability is unclear” ( 1998: 113). However, credible electoral contests can provide legitimacy to governments and become practicable way(s) of resolving conflicts without bloodshed and violence (Przeworski 2003). As further argued by Diamond, with good elections, “People are more likely to express support for democracy when they see it working to provide genuine political competition, including alternation of power, and when it has at least some effect in controlling corruption, limiting abuse of power, and ensuring rule of law” (cited in Reynolds 2011: 72). But what is the electoral record in the Philippines? Notwithstanding our reputation as the country with the longest history of elections in Asia, we also have an electoral history steeped in vicious cycles of violence and systematic fraud and manipulation. As documented in my study, the post-war history of elections in the country show little credibility in the face of unrelenting machinations to win such contests either by the outright use of force or vote and voter manipulation in many areas of the country. For instance, the revelations about the massive vote manipulations that took place in the 2004 and 2007 elections reveal how deep and pervasive is the problem with the direct involvement of the country's top civilian and military elites. As further explained in my study, not even the shift to an automated election system promises an end to these problems. Automation will not automatically solve our electoral problems unless more basic problems of political stability, institutional capabilities and accountabilities are addressed. For instance, our weak system of electoral governance as exemplified by an organizationally incompetent Comelec lacking independence and the overall culture of impunity enjoyed by erring officials need to be decisively resolved. Contributing to the growing literature on political elites in the country, my study, moreover, provides an updated documentation and analysis of how pervasive and resilient has been the dominance of political clans in the country at two levels of governing: governorships and congressional positions since the restoration of formal elections in 1987. If the continuing cycles of electoral violence and fraud disqualify the country from any claim to having “free and fair elections”, the entrenched dominance of political clans over two key governing positions likewise disables us from claiming a tradition of competitive elections.