110 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy Marcos' main instrument in implementing his authoritarian rule was the military and the national police (Hernandez 2002: 27-28). He had to hold its support and extended favors and privileges to the organization particularly to the military leadership. It became a rather common practice to extend the term of office of the chief of staff beyond his retirement age. The military organization was restructured to accommodate the promotion of a growing number of officers to the various grades of the rank of general. The established rules on the appointment to executive positions of the civil service were in effect revised to appease the military establishment and the police organization. The policy appeasement led military officers to be appointed to positions in the civilian bureaucracy—bureau of customs, bureau of internal revenue, government owned and controlled corporations, the Foreign Service corps, and local government units, among others. The domain of military authority has expanded into the civilian bodies of the government. It was not very difficult for military leaders to see that Marcos depended on the armed forces for the continued survival of his authoritarian rule. It was not also difficult for the military leaders to infer that they themselves, even without Marcos, could also employ the same military force and install a military junta. Indeed history has many examples of military leaders who grabbed political power from the civilian leaders. Perhaps Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte are the most well-known among them. The military adventurism in our country can be seen in this light, although admittedly, there are other important specific reasons behind this phenomenon in our democratic transition (The Final Report of the (Davide) Fact-Finding Commission October 1990: 16-19). Moreover, the military establishment, as a whole, had been observed as supportive of the democratic transition. In times of the deep division in the military such as during the coups of the 1980s, the majority of the officers and men manifested their constitutionalist orientation by fighting the rebel soldiers (see Abueva in Miranda 1997: 54). Notwithstanding this reassuring characteristic of the military establishment, its interventionist tendency has made it the gatekeeper in the extra-constitutional transfer of Presidential power from Estrada to Arroyo when it withdrew its support from Estrada. Moreover, recent incidents of military adventurism indicate that the military has not returned and stayed in the barracks. These incidents include the Oakwood mutiny in 2003, the break with the chain of command of some Marines and Scout Ranger units in 2006, and the 2007 attempt of the rebellious soldiers with some civil society personalities to dramatize their demand for President Arroyo to resign. The proclamation of a state of emergency in 2006, and the government's warrantless