45. The recent reviews of the UK’s intelligence and security apparatus have emphasised the importance of having a clear, consistent legislative framework that is coherent, transparent and accessible. As Anderson notes: “The fact that the subject matter is technical is no excuse for obscurity. It should be possible to set out a series of limited powers, safeguards and review mechanisms with a high degree of clarity and… without technical jargon”. 35 46. Similarly, the ISR Panel lists “legislative clarity” as one of its ten tenets for testing legislation for intrusions against privacy, noting that while such legislation is not likely to be simple, it must be: “clearly explained in Codes of Practice that have Parliamentary approval, are kept up-to-date and are accessible to citizens, the private sector, foreign Governments and practitioners alike”.36 47. UN reports also emphasise the importance of clear, accessible legislative language. UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue has recommended that legal frameworks governing communications surveillance measures meet “a standard of clarity and precision that is sufficient to ensure that individuals have advance notice of and can foresee their application.”37 48. The Commission is of the view that the statutory language in New Zealand’s intelligence and security legislation is often less than clear or precise. In particular, the Commission has noted its concern that important terminology, such as the definition of “private communications” under s 4 of the GCSB Act, is vague and risks undermining reasonable expectations of privacy.38 49. Another related example is the requirement under s 8D(1)(a) of the GCSB Act that the GCSB deliver its functions in a “human rights standards recognized by New Zealand law”, which is ambiguous as to whether this includes ratified international human rights treaties. This is a crucial issue when considering the obligations that the GCSB has with regards to the right to privacy, a right that is guaranteed in international human rights law under Article 17 of the ICCPR, but conspicuously absent from the NZBORA. A unified approach 35 A Question of Trust, para 13.33 A Democratic License to Operate, p xiv 37 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression Frank La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, 17 April 2013, para 83, p 21 38 Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, paras 27-28 36 Page 88 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR

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