Reviewers have taken in this matter to date and welcomes any opportunity for ongoing dialogue. Initial Observations 4. Over the last two years, the role and functions of New Zealand’s intelligence and security services have been subject to an unprecedented degree of public interest, judicial scrutiny and legislative reform. This occurred against a backdrop of domestic and international events that shone a public spotlight on intelligence services, in particular their extensive mass surveillance and data interception capabilities. The Commission has taken a close interest in these developments and their implications for human rights in New Zealand.3 5. The legal and operational functions of these essential services give rise to human rights considerations that are fundamental to the functions of a modern democratic state. With this in mind, the Commission recommended in its 2013 report to the Prime Minister that an independent review of New Zealand’s intelligence and security regime take place4. The Government has referred to the Commission’s recommendation, and the subsequent legislative action it took to establish the periodic review process, in its sixth periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.5 6. The activities of intelligence and security agencies can be described as having a twofold effect on human rights. Firstly, these activities may limit the human rights of people in New Zealand, an obvious example being the impact of surveillance operations on the privacy rights of affected persons. Conversely, the role and functions of intelligence and security services enhance the Government’s capability of meeting its human rights related duty to protect its people from harm. 7. This has led to a complex, polarised public debate, both in New Zealand and internationally. In his review of the UK’s intelligence and security legislation, David Anderson QC described this debate as “double-jointed”, dominated by the arguments of law enforcement officials and “securocrats” for more operational capability and fewer restraints on the one hand; and arguments by civil liberties advocates for more safeguards and less capabilities on the other. Anderson comments that “the silent majority” (the general public) sit in between these 3 For further detail, please refer to the bundle of Commission reports and related international materials dated 27 July 2015 provided to the Reviewers 4 Human Rights Commission, Report to the Prime Minister: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill; Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill, and associated wider issues relating to surveillance and the human rights of people in New Zealand, 9 July 2013, para 49, p 12 5 New Zealand Government, New Zealand’s sixth periodic report under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2015, p 13, paras 83-88 Page 78 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR