Reform and Abolition: The Philippine Party-list System 189 In another subsequent ruling in 2013, the high court through Justice Carpio also ruled that the Party-list law is not exclusive to the marginalized, thus, allowing the participation of other political parties. In justifying its ruling, the SC pointed to the intent behind the Party-list system by citing deliberations of the 1986 constitutional commission particularly that of Christian Monsod who said that the “party list system is not synonymous with that of sectoral representation.” Both SC decisions drew strong criticisms not only from Party-list organizations but also the civil society movement. The impact of the SC rulings was to open wide the Party-list system to family dynasties, traditional political parties, as well as multi-millionaires, hence, ensure their dominance in Congress. This ruling negates earlier SC rulings to make the PL system as a “social justice tool” and rectify the institutional injustice against the country's poor majority. Attesting to the electoral dynamics against the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is the increase in the number of PL representatives with dynastic ties since the latest SC rulings were issued. Another observation is that the high court may have gone beyond its mandate to interpret the law by usurping the legislative function of Congress. Underlying all this controversy is that RA 7941 on the Party List Law itself appears to be vague, failing to specify for instance, a clear allocation formula for Party-list seats as well as denitive parameters for dening basic concepts such as “marginalization” and “underrepresentation”, thus generating often conicting interpretations and formulas. The Comelec and the Party List System In the regime of the Party-list system, the Comelec under various chairmanships has been on the receiving end of complaints and petitions from PL organizations. Many of the legal grievances – at times including allegations of corruption - had to do with the poll body's responsibility with regards the accreditation of Party-list groups as well as the ling of candidacy and submission of the list of nominees. In one sensational case, Comelec was scored for its refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad which espouses LGBT rights, citing moral grounds as cause for disqualication. Yet in many other cases, the poll body approved the accreditation of Party-list groups despite their clear disqualication for their connection to public ofcials or their attempt to represent dubious marginalized groups such as “security guards” or “balut vendors”. The Comelec's injudicious accreditation of Party-list groups that will not normally pass tighter scrutiny partly explains the bastardization of the Party-list system given the now effective co-optation of this “social justice tool” by the country's political elite. Voter education being likewise a responsibility of the Comelec, this important electoral activity needs to be given more attention considering the low level of public awareness on the Party-list system. This omission has