118 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Second Edition of the nominees, then Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas announced his “withdrawal” from the nomination of his party as the standard-bearer for the 2010 Presidential election. A few days later, then Senator Benigno S. Aquino III, declared that he would run for president in the coming elections. In the end, CPM threw its support for the candidacy of Aquino and Roxas. As regards Aquino, he was reported to have garnered 82% of the votes of the qualied members (4,602) of CPM. Subsequent reports on the CPM website showed the full roster of the Liberal Party's senatorial slate. As such, CPM supported a single party's ticket, that of the Liberal Party. There is no news report or information from CPM's website about the other candidates that the group supported for other elective posts. A key informant6 reveals that while CPM leaders have met with Cabinet secretaries who also came from the ranks of civil society, with the latter encouraging CSO engagement with select agencies in initiatives that include budget monitoring and advocacy, the key informant observes that CPM has an “identity crisis,” with its members unable to stop thinking like “development NGOs” and think of itself as a “political movement.” What has happened and will happen to CPM would serve as another substantive lesson for CSOs that have taken the political-electoral path, as a specic track, or engaged the state, as a general orientation. It does appear that for many CSOs there is no choice but to engage the state, at any level—from the barangay (Quimpo 2007)7 to the national—or through any of the institutions (including political parties and elections) in political society. Though admittedly a number of state-directed interventions have resulted in frustrating experiences, the consequence of not engaging the state may be much more telling. Despite the limits of engaging the state, the experiences across the last 25 years portray very clear opportunities within state institutions and processes, especially if CSOs were to disabuse themselves from the illusion that the major changes would come soon; that these changes are expected from specic political leaders; that reform measures or development programs will automatically produce their intended consequences; that politicians who mouth reforms are sincere; or that armed struggle still presents itself as a viable option to signicantly overhaul the stagnating political order. CSO leaders and groups that engage the state must also protect their reputation by having their involvement known to their colleagues, allies, or constituents within civil society. A case in point is the continually questioned involvement of CODE-NGO with the Peace Bonds. While CODE NGO had sufciently explained its transactions in the past, the issue continues to be hurled against the network, not surprisingly by elements that belong to rival civil society groups as well as traditional politicians. The transparency demanded by civil society from the state is a transparency that civil society leaders themselves must practice for it is only by having all their actions known that civil society could maintain its moral capital against state elements that are