The Never Ending Democratization of the Philippines 79 end of the Aquino III administration in 2016. It covers ve administrations—Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo, and Aquino III but not the new Duterte administration. The focus on constitutional structure accepts the premise that political rules inuence the economy and society. In other words, “political institutions matter”. Institutions include informal and formal rules. The enforcement or revision of formal rules through reward or punishment shapes the patterns of interaction which are internalized. These patterns develop or change informal rules or norms, actor identity and interest (Wendt 1999: 224-33). Informal rules cover norms and traditions, while formal rules “include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts. The hierarchy of such rules, from constitutions, to statute and common laws, and nally to individual contracts denes constraints, from the general rules to particular specications” (North 1990, 2009: 47). Political rules are closely examined in this study. North broadly denes political rules as the hierarchical structure of the polity, its basic decision structure, and the explicit characteristics of agenda control (North Ibid.: 47). The Human Development Network in its Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009 employed the institutional approach to analyze in detail the impact of the bureaucracy, budget management, and the enforcement of rules about checks and balances and accountability on human development. The report says: “There is wide agreement that the weakness of political institutions in the Philippines is a major, if not the major hindrance to its further progress” (Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009: 2; see also Arugay 2005: 63-88). Moreover, the country has long been described as a “soft state,” where rules and enforcement are for sale (Fabella, 2008 cited in Ibid: 2). In this study, the emphasis shifts to the interactions of the three branches of government in the context of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances and how these interactions affect horizontal accountability. The study follows the observation which states that: “In the case of the Philippines' postEDSA democratic (?)2 government, scholars would have to be more detailed in their understanding and analysis of institutions…” (Pilapil 2006: 105). This observation resonates with the view that studies about the “struggle for a fuller democracy” in the Philippines are sparse (Tria Kerkvliet 2005: 22). However, this study does not cover some aspects of the concept of political institution, such as political parties and electoral system that deal with vertical accountability (see Pilapil Ibid.: 93). This study is limited to horizontal accountability. In various chapters of this book, Professors Temario Rivera, Rene Azurin, and Bobby Tuazon discuss key aspects of our electoral and party system, as well as the role of political families, in understanding the continuing problems of the democratization process in our country. The emphasis on political rules about horizontal accountability might not enable us to tell the whole story of our stalled democratization, but it could help us understand a signicant part of it. This is an acknowledgment of the fact that there are doubts about the signicance of the institutional approach (See for