(S. 345). The Explanation to the section as modified by an amendment in 2006 indicates that sexual harassment can take place in situations which do not constitute rape or grave sexual abuse. (Explanation 2). Another Explanation added in 2006 clarifies that compensation payable for injuries includes psychological and mental trauma. (Explanation 3). Sexual harassment by ragging in educational institutions is specifically included in the Ragging Act (S. 17 defining sexual harassment) and S. 2 (2) defining ragging). In an unusual case which was decided in 1994, even before Penal Code Amendment of 1995, the High Court of Colombo convicted a man under the Bribery Act, for soliciting sex from a woman employee in return for a transfer. (See Annex). j. Gender Based Sexual Violence in Marriage, and Intimate Partner Sexual Violence Spousal/Partner Violence Conduct of a male spouse that amounts to severe psychological and or sexual abuse, coerced sex, including marital rape and sexual abuse causing unwanted pregnancy, by sexual violence or denial of the right to use contraceptives, all of which deny the woman’s reproductive rights and right to personal security and bodily integrity, can amount to cruelty as it relates to our law of marriage and divorce. Similarly intentional communication of STD and HIV or failure to communicate information to a partner can be considered cruelty. (See section on Non-Fatal injuries and Law of Marriage). Spousal rights and the right of privacy can interface with the definition of cruelty for the purposes of the law. This aspect will be considered in dealing with pregnancy and GBV in the next section. We have noted already that the right to privacy is a concept of the law on civil wrongs, and is not guaranteed in the Constitution. Medical practice indicates that testing blood for STDs and HIV is voluntary, and patient confidentiality is maintained. (See Annex). The implication of this policy for women has not been considered in formulating law and policy. This type of violence can constitute domestic violence under the Domestic Violence Act of 2005 and give remedies that will be discussed later. All the above are remedies provided in civil legal actions. However the criminal law is gender neutral. As pointed out earlier, there is no defined offence of cruelty to women in the Penal Code, and a spouse can be criminally prosecuted only for the general offences relating to causing fatal and non-fatal injuries, or sexual violence, that have already been discussed. We have noted the very limited circumstances in which marital rape is an offence. The English Common law prohibition on prosecution for marital rape seems to have been retained by the language used in other sections of the Penal Code Amendment 1995 and 1998 which cover forced sex by threat or intimidation (S. 363 (b)) and after intoxication or administration of drugs (S. 363 (c)). However violence by cohabiting partners will be covered by these offences. The offence of grave sexual abuse (S. 365 B) does not specifically exclude married spouses, as in the definition of marital rape in S.363 A. A specific provision (S. 363 (d)) clarifies that rape can be committed by a man by deceit pretending to be a woman’s husband, knowing that the woman consents to sexual intercourse because ‘she believes he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.” It may therefore be argued that the English Common law restricting prosecution for marital rape has been modified, and that prosecution for marital grave sexual abuse is possible after the amendments of 1995. The latter phrase includes situations of cohabitation with a man in the belief that there has been a lawful marriage. 20 COMPENDIUM ON LAW, GENDER BASED VIOLENCE AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS