New Zealand Human Rights Commission: Te Kähui Tika Tangata In relation to the second point (the extent of the limitation placed on freedom of expression by section 319(2)), it was relevant that the mental element of the section 319(2) offence (wilful promotion) is narrow in scope and captures “only the most intentionally extreme forms of expression.”202 As such, the limitations placed on freedom of expression by section 319(2) are minimal. Dickson CJ also noted:203 hate propaganda opposes the targeted group’s ability to find self-fulfillment by articulating their thoughts and ideas. It impacts on that group’s ability to respond to the substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier to their full participation in our democracy. Indeed, a particularly insidious aspect of hate speech is that it acts to cut off any path of reply by the group under attack. It does this not only by attempting to marginalize the group so that their reply will be ignored: it also forces the group to argue for their basic humanity or social standing, as a precondition to participating in the deliberative aspects of our democracy. Canada’s 10 territories also have human rights legislation that provides civil remedies. Most of the legislation applies to an expansive range of protected characteristics such as.204 • Race • Religious belief • Colour • Gender • Gender identity • Gender expression • Physical disability • Mental disability • Age • Ancestry • Place of origin • Marital status • Source of income • Family status • Sexual orientation In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the legitimacy of human rights legislation that restricts hate speech in Sakatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott. In Whatcott, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the hate speech provision under section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code is constitutional in light of the right to freedom of expression. The case concerned four complaints that were filed with the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission about four flyers allegedly promoting hatred against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation that were published and distributed by Mr Whatcott. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the Saskatchewan hate speech provision (with some words removed because they were overbroad) was justified and constitutional. The Court considered the definitions of “hatred and contempt,” affirming the analysis of the Court in 1990 in R v Keegstra and Taylor v The Canadian Human Rights Commission, and setting out the approach that courts and tribunals should use in interpreting these terms. The Court explained that they refer to expression of an unusual and extreme nature, involving vilification, dehumanization, and reviling. This interpretation excludes merely offensive expression. The Court noted that freedom of expression is central to democracy, but it is not absolute, and limitations may be justified under section 1 of the Charter. In considering justification for the limit, the Court held that the objective of the legislation is pressing and substantial. At 783. At 763. 204 Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, New Brunswick, New Foundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, Saskatchewan. 202 203 36