69. On the part of the State, the employment of CVOs and SCAAs is necessary for counter-insurgency, as the AFP force is not sufficient to combat several insurgency movements waged by the CPP-NPA, the MILF, the MNLF, and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Auxiliary forces can take responsibility for village defense from insurgents. Moreover, the counter-insurgency platforms have stretched the budget of the State and eroded its capacity to provide services to the public in general. The legitimization of private militias with their integration into the AFP unburdens the military from having to protect private investments. 70. However, armed auxiliary forces do not undergo trainings as much as the regular forces and, by AFP admission, do not necessarily possess the latter’s discipline.72 In the case of SCAAs, since they receive their salaries and allowances from private sources, they may be employed for purposes not sanctioned by law. Add to this the laxity of regulatory mechanism in accessing firearms. This contributes to the proliferation of privately armed militias which may be recognized as SCAAs, lending vigilantism some cloak of legitimacy. 71. In essence, these are actually paramilitary groups, armed by the government but largely uncontrolled by it. Their irregular or auxiliary status blurs the line of accountability of the AFP or other legally mandated authorities. The latter can disown or repudiate acts of the paramilitaries or militias which have implications on HR accountability. Private actors, not usually regarded as HR duty bearers, are generally not held accountable for HR violations, although held accountable under criminal laws of the state. This contributes to a culture of impunity where state security forces are actually implicated. 72. In its 2012 Concluding Observations on the Philippines, the UNHRC expressed alarm concerning privately-armed military auxiliary groups, as well as the high number of loose weapons in the country. Other member States of the United Nations expressed equal concern. During the second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review of the Philippines in 2012, some States recommended the revocation of Executive Order 546 and the dismantling or disarming of paramilitary forces, militias, and armies.73 73. Whether organized according to customary law or not, the Alamara is armed. It is alleged to be a paramilitary group with Lumad membership, taking orders from the AFP. It is implicated in egregious HR abuses against IPs,74 including those who encamped in Haran. 74. The Commission reminds the AFP that, under Section 22 of the IPRA, it “shall not recruit members of the ICCs/IPs against their will into the armed 72 Dona Z. Pazzibugan, Paramilitary force out in 4 years, says Army commanding general in Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 May 2012, accessed from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/203855/paramilitary-force-out-in-4-years-says-army-commanding-general. 73 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Philippines, A/HRC/21/12, 9 July 2012 74 Children’s Rehabilitation Center, Child rights groups condemn Alamara and the AFP as vicious violators of human rights! 30 August 2013 accessed from http://www.childrehabcenter.org/news/ mediareleases/child-rights-groups-condemn-Alamaraand-afp-vicious-violators-human-rights. 17