resettlement process and promote in-city resettlement outcomes. 94 Even in the
context of Metro Manila, LGUs are at least in principle more in touch with the issues
that affect security of tenure in their local community. For instance, the dynamic of
land issues in highly urbanised Makati is entirely different from the largely suburban
LGUs of Caloocan and Muntinlupa. However, the decentralised nature of the
framework can also inhibit participation and the enjoyment of human rights by allowing
local government to avoid compliance with the law in favour of more politically
successful strategies. This problem is compounded in the situation of resettlement
outside a particular LGU’s jurisdiction. While implementation can work effectively
where an entire eviction and resettlement programme takes place in a single
municipality, if a community is to be moved to another LGU then there is significant
potential for conflict and problems with coordination among the different local
governments involved.
Decentralisation is not of itself adverse to the effective enjoyment of human rights. If
LGUs are provided with adequate technical assistance from specialised national
housing agencies they will be able to develop and implement programmes more
efficiently. Nonetheless, a decentralised institutional architecture requires extensive
safeguards to ensure localised power structures are kept in check, while balancing the
provision of independence to LGUs to innovate in the development of localised policy
initiatives during evictions and resettlement. The devolution of the ‘clearing house’
function on evictions is one prominent barrier to effective decentralisation in the
context of human rights protections. LGUs are often directly involved in all aspects of
evictions and resettlement, or at least play a central role in facilitating the process in
coordination with national urban development agencies. Such an active and central
actor in the eviction and resettlement process should not be entrusted with an
independent monitoring and compliance-review function, as currently exists in the
provision of certificates of compliance by the local housing boards. Evidence clearly
suggests that LHBs are unable to perform this function to a satisfactory standard. The
Philippine NGO Urban Poor Associates has reported that 81% of evictions in 2012
proceeded illegally without any certificate of compliance provided by responsible local
administrators.95
The composition of LHBs, which are comprised predominantly of local politicians or
LGU officials, allows the political sympathies of senior local officials to influence
proceedings and the provision of the certificate of compliance. This conflict of interest
must be rectified by removing the monitoring and compliance-review function from
LHBs and transferring it to an independent, preferably national, body. This does not
mean that LHBs should be disbanded, as they can and should still remain as a vehicle
for the development of localised policy initiatives and community participation in
governance. HUDCC’s Guidebook for Local Housing specifies a wide range of
programmatic functions that LHBs should undertake that are entirely separate from
evictions and resettlement monitoring. 96 As identified by UN-HABITAT, a stronger
connection between the national housing architecture and LGUs is likely to improve
the quality of housing programmes in local communities.97 However, LGUs cannot be
94
See: UN-HABITAT, Innovative Tenure in the Philippines: Challenges, Approaches and Institutionalization, 2012, p. 44.
Urban Poor Associates, Eviction Monitor 2012: Annual Report, 2012, p. 1.
96
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, LGU’s Guidebook for Local Housing Project/Program, 2009, pp. 8-10.
97
UN-HABITAT, Innovative Tenure in the Philippines: Challenges, Approaches and Institutionalization, 2012, pp. 44-47.
95
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