PASTOR RAYMOND KOH
expect members of the public to produce evidence on a beyond
reasonable doubt standard and yet expect a verdict to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt;
(e) a magistrate conduc�ng an inquiry of death is merely to ascertain
whether anyone is criminally concerned in the cause of death. He
has no power to hold or find anyone criminally liable in the cause of
death on a beyond reasonable doubt standard;
(f) in the event a person or persons is/are arrested for being
criminally liable in the cause of death it is then for the prosecu�on
to charge the person/s for an offence of homicide and where it will
be incumbent upon the prosecu�on to prove a case beyond
reasonable doubt before a convic�on can be secured;
(g) for the police to effect an arrest of a suspect, all that the police
have to show at that stage of inves�ga�on is that there is
reasonable ground of suspicion to support the arrest. The police
most certainly do not have to have reasonable grounds on a beyond
reasonable doubt standard, before effec�ng the arrest. Now, if the
police can effect an arrest based on reasonable suspicion (see
Shaaban & Ors v Chong Fook Kam & Anor [1969] 2 MLJ 219) why
then should the bar or threshold be raised in an inquiry of death to
a standard beyond reasonable doubt before the learned magistrate
can return a verdict of homicide? I see no basis for this approach as
a�er all, in fact and in reality, the recording of evidence in an inquiry
by the learned magistrate can be likened to an extension of
inves�ga�ons by the police. In Shaaban’s case it was held that the
police are en�tled to make an arrest if a reasonable suspicion existed
that the suspect was concerned with the offence. It is unnecessary
for the police to show that there was prima facie proof of such
offence before an arrest.
[119] It is not in dispute that in an inquest the evidence adduced
must be credible so as to become the basis for the coroners finding
(see Inquest into the death of Sujatha Krishnan, deceased [2009] 5
CLJ 783); that the verdict must not be based on guess work but on
par�culars which have been proved in evidence (see R v Huntback;
exparte Lockley [1944] KB 606, Re Derek Selby, deceased [1971] 2
MLJ 277); a magistrate who conducts an inquiry must confine
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