[119] It is not in dispute that in an inquest the evidence adduced must be credible so as to become the basis for the coroners finding (see Inquest into the death of Sujatha Krishnan, deceased [2009] 5 CLJ 783); that the verdict must not be based on guesswork but on par�culars which have been proved in evidence (see R v Huntback; exparte Lockley [1944] KB 606, Re Derek Selby, deceased [1971] 2 MLJ 277); a magistrate who conducts an inquiry must confine himself to the evidence made available to him and at the end of the day must decide on that evidence alone (see Public Prosecutor v Shanmugam & Ors [2002] 6 MLJ 562); that a magistrate can only make a definite finding based on proved facts produced and not on mere conjectures (see Re Rumie Mahlie, deceased [2007] MLJU 280; [2007] 10 CLJ 69). [120] In Victoria, Australia in the case of Anderson v Blashki [1993] VR 89 it was held that the standard of proof to be applied by the coroner in inves�ga�ng a death is the civil standard of the balance of probabili�es (see also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336). In the infamous case of Inquest into the death of Azaria Chantel Loren Chamberlain [2012] NTMC 020, it was held by the High Court of Australia that in the coronial jurisdic�on, the test applied is a balance of probabili�es test. 103 AMRI CHE MAT a beyond reasonable doubt standard, before effec�ng the arrest. Now, if the police can effect an arrest based on reasonable suspicion (see Shaaban & Ors v Chong Fook Kam & Anor [1969] 2 MLJ 219) why then should the bar or threshold be raised in an inquiry of death to a standard beyond reasonable doubt before the learned magistrate can return a verdict of homicide? I see no basis for this approach as a�er all, in fact and in reality, the recording of evidence in an inquiry by the learned magistrate can be likened to an extension of inves�ga�ons by the police. In Shaaban’s case it was held that the police are en�tled to make an arrest if a reasonable suspicion existed that the suspect was concerned with the offence. It is unnecessary for the police to show that there was prima facie proof of such offence before an arrest.