AMRI CHE MAT (b) the rules on admissibility of evidence and procedure in an inquiry of death are not as strict as in a criminal trial. The magistrate is on a mere fact finding mission and is allowed to consider even hearsay evidence. In the case of Re Loh Kah Kheng (deceased) [1990] 2 MLJ 126 it was held that a coroner is not bound by the normal procedure of courts and rules of evidence; (c) where the rules rela�ng to evidence and procedure are lax, it will be inconsistent to require a magistrate to return a verdict at the close of an inquiry on a beyond reasonable doubt standard; (d) it will be incorrect to require the family of Teoh Beng Hock to have to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt before the learned magistrate can return a verdict of homicide as the means to do so are severely limited. The family of Teoh Beng Hock, being members of the public, simply do not have the powers of inves�ga�on as possessed by the police. And where the threshold for proof in an inquiry of death is lower, it will not be correct nor necessary to expect members of the public to produce evidence on a beyond reasonable doubt standard and yet expect a verdict to be proved beyond reasonable doubt; (e) a magistrate conduc�ng an inquiry of death is merely to ascertain whether anyone is criminally concerned in the cause of death. He has no power to hold or find anyone criminally liable in the cause of death on a beyond reasonable doubt standard; (f) in the event a person or persons is/are arrested for being criminally liable in the cause of death it is then for the prosecu�on to charge the person/s for an offence of homicide and where it will be incumbent upon the prosecu�on to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt before a convic�on can be secured; (g) for the police to effect an arrest of a suspect, all that the police have to show at that stage of inves�ga�ons is that there is reasonable ground of suspicion to support the arrest. The police most certainly do not have to have reasonable grounds on 102