From Four Nodes of History: The Human Rights Challenge in the Philippine Security Sector
Without air cover, the US Asiatic Fleet was ordered by Washington to abandon the Philippines and take refuge in Australia
where it became a white elephant without any infrastructure
and supplies to carry out any further offensive actions.
MacArthur’s incredible conduct changed the entire air and
naval situation in the whole Asia-Pacific in favor of Japan
within 24 hours of the war. Yet he was not relieved of his post
and was instead allowed to continue being the commander
of USAFFE.
b) MacArthur issued a series of irrational commands
that led to the total destruction of the USAFFE in Luzon
leading to the final surrender in Bataan and Corregidor
After MacArthur lost his air force by default within 8 hours
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he still had an infantry force that could crush a Japanese invasion. Even while
most of his troops were untested in battle, they were three
times bigger than the Japanese that would land in the Philippines. He had a total of 150,000 troops with tank and artillery
support, some state-of-the-art submarines, bombers (B-14s
in Laoag) and fighter planes that survived. About 120,000
of his troops were in Luzon, with a core of 8 Divisions (the
Northern Luzon Force under General Wainwright with 4 Divisions and 1 Cavalry Regiment; the South Luzon Force under
80
General Parker with 2 Divisions; and a strategic reserve of 2
Divisions in the vicinity of Clark Air Base).
3 more divisions were deployed for the Visayas and Mindanao area under General Sharp.
Homma landed his main force of 2 Divisions (including the
pride of his army, the 48th Division) totaling 43,110 men32 in
Lingayen Coast and a secondary landing at Lamon Bay with
a total of 7,000 troops. All in all, he had a force of 50,110 in
Luzon, with 80-100 tanks and artillery of not more than 60
artillery pieces. About a third of his infantry had bicycles.
While MacArthur was quite familiar with the coastal terrain
of Luzon, having studied its coastal defense from which he
based the 1935 Defense Act, he did not prepare for its defense. The defense of both Lingayen and Lamon Bay were improvisations when the Japanese forces were already en route
for landing. As a result, the improvised defenses without the
benefit of entrenched artillery, pill boxes and running trenches easily collapsed.
As MacArthur received news of the successful landings in Lingayen and Lamon Bay, he panicked.
War Plan Orange Three (WPO3) was a contingency plan that