100 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy In this study, the emphasis shifts to the interactions of the three branches of government in the context of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances and how these interactions affect horizontal accountability. The study follows the observation which states that: “In the case of the Philippines' postEDSA democratic (?)2 government, scholars would have to be more detailed in their understanding and analysis of institutions…” (Pilapil 2006: 105). This observation resonates with the view that studies about the “struggle for a fuller democracy” in the Philippines are sparse (Tria Kerkvliet 2005: 22). However, this study does not cover some aspects of the concept of political institution, such as political parties and electoral system that deal with vertical accountability (see Pilapil Ibid.: 93). This study is limited to horizontal accountability. Professor Temario Rivera discusses political parties and electoral system in another chapter of this volume. The emphasis on political rules about horizontal accountability might not enable us to tell the whole story, but it could help us understand a significant part of it. This is an acknowledgment of the fact that there are doubts about the significance of the institutional approach (See for example Gasiorowski and Power 1998: 740-771). Moreover, in a comprehensive listing of the problems of democratic transition, Professor Jose V. Abueva identified 24 issues that have to be addressed, and many of them are society-oriented issues (Abueva in Miranda op.cit: 10-48). It should also be noted that other society-oriented analysis of the Philippine polity has pointed to its “patrimonial” or “personalistic” or even the “predatory nature of the elite” as the most important factor that affects the democratization process (Budd 2004: 1-6; see also Yuko Kasuya and Quimpo 2010: 1-6). Another society-oriented study sees the weak Philippine state as showing potency in the civilian supremacy over the military and electoral politics (Abinales 2005: 27-62). In the context of institutionalism, however, the sharp focus on institutional flaws and reforms can help move the transition to substantive democracy. The study of Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse asserts this view. They say that their data suggest that political institutions, “the institutions that place effective constraints on executive power, play a crucial role in democratic consolidation” (Kapstein and Converse 2008: 57). Discussions of democratic constitutional structure cover the Presidential, parliamentary and hybrid forms of government. In comparative politics, the usual example of the Presidential form of government is that of the United States of America, while the common example of the parliamentary form is that of the United Kingdom. The French Fifth Republic is an example of the hybrid form of Presidential and parliamentary government. The parliamentary form of democracy appears to be the favored constitutional structure over the