Annual Report 1999-2000 □ Act of God (fis rmjor) is defined to be such a direct, violent, sudden and irresistible act of nature as could not, by any amount of ability, have been foreseen, or if foreseen, could not, by any amount of human care and skill, have been resisted. □ Vu major, to afford a defence, must be tlie proximate cause, the causa c'atisaus, and not merely a causa sine qua nan of the damage complained of. The mere fact that vis major co-existed with, or followed the negligence, is not an adequate defence. Before an Act of God may be admitted as an excuse, the defendant must himself have done all that he was bound to do. A more stringent rule of strict liability than the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, was laid down by the Supreme Court recently in the case oiMCMehta v Union ofIndia. The case related to the harm caused by the escape of oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram Foods and Fertilizer Industries. Tlie Court held that the rule of Rylands v Fletcher, which was evolved in the 19th century, did not fully meet the needs of a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology, where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries were necessary to be carried on as part of the development programme, and that it was necessary to lay down a new rule to adequately deal with problems arising in an industrialised economy. The Court laid down the rule as follows: 'Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, and harm results to anyone on account of an incident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, resulting, for example, in the escape of a toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident, and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate visk-vis the tortuous principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The Court earlier pointed out that this duty is "absolute and non-delegable" and the enterprise cannot escape liability by showing that it had taken all reasonable care and there was no negligence on its part. The basis of the new rule as indicated by the Supreme Court is: (1) If an enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume tliat such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any incident (including indemnification of all tliose who suffer harm in the accident), arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overheads; and (2) the enterprise alone has the resources to discover and guard against hazard or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards'.' Case of Shri Devi Shanker gunned down by a forest officer: Rajasthan (Case No. 16588/96-97/NHRC) The Commission received a complaint from Shri Ghasi Lai from District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan, alleging that officials of the Forest Department, Rajasthan, shot dead one Devi 1 AIR 1987 SC 965. 124 I