against internal and external threats and advance the interests of the nation as a whole, intelligence and security agencies do not undermine democracy or the rights of individuals in the process. As publicly funded agencies, they must also be held accountable for how they use public money. Oversight must ensure the Agencies are operating efficiently and effectively in the interests of the country and in accordance with the values of its citizens.144 New Zealand has several intelligence and security oversight mechanisms in place.145 The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is provided with powers under the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 to inquire into complaints by individuals who claim they have been adversely affected by any act, omission, practice, policy, or procedure of an intelligence and security agency.146 During an inquiry the IGIS may compel the giving of information, take evidence from witnesses in private, summon and examine under oath any person who is able to give information relevant to the inquiry. On the completion of the inquiry, the IGIS must prepare a written report containing his or her conclusions and recommendations which may include recommendations that the agency provide redress including remedies that involve the payment of compensation.147 The report is published publicly and the report or findings cannot be challenged or reviewed or called into question by a court except on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.148 Other intelligence and security oversight mechanisms include the Chief Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants who considers applications (jointly with the Minister) for any warrant that targets a New Zealander and makes application by agencies to access “restricted information” that is subject to strict statutory restrictions. The Intelligence and Security Committee is the parliamentary oversight committee for the 144 Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy, First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security to parliament, p.52, para 4.4. 145 See NZ Intelligence Community, Oversight https://www.nzic.govt.nz/ oversight/. 146 Intelligence and Security Act 2017, s 171. The most common type of complaints relate to adverse recommendations by the NZSIS as to security clearances required for employment, http://www.igis.govt.nz/ complaints/ 147 Intelligence and Security Act 2017, s 185. 148 Ibid. s 190. intelligence agencies. The Committee’s functions include examining policies of security agencies; considering bills or petitions relating to security agencies, and requesting the Inspector-General to conduct an inquiry into any matter relating to compliance with NZ law, including human rights law and propriety of activities. Within New Zealand, there has been an oversight group established that includes the IGIS, Privacy Commissioner, Auditor-General and the Chief Ombudsman.149 The NZ Intelligence Community is also subject to oversight of the independent authorities such as the Auditor-General, Privacy Commissioner, Ombudsman and the judiciary. In terms of oversight of the use of personal data in the social sector, as discussed earlier, the Ministry of Social Development is currently developing a Privacy, Human Rights and Ethics Framework. The original intention of the framework is that it would apply to predictive risk modelling initiatives in the social sector (specifically the child protection and social security sectors). However, the framework potentially could be expanded to apply more generally to all information sharing initiatives within the social sector. 4.2 Transparency States should be transparent about the use and scope of techniques and powers that potentially infringe the right to privacy.150 This includes administrative processes related to the gathering of personal information and data.151 David Anderson, the UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism legislation, helpfully summed up the need for transparency in his review of surveillance legislation in the UK stating: The fact that the subject-matter is technical is no excuse for obscurity. It should be possible to set out a series of limited powers, safeguards and review mechanisms with a high degree of clarity and . . . without technical jargon: the place for the 149 Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Privacy Commissioner Briefing for the Incoming Minister of Justice: Hon Andrew Little, October 2017, para 4.2 https://privacy.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Briefing-for-Incoming-Minister-October-2017.pdf 150 Report of Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression, Frank La Rue, (17 April 2013) para 91. 151 Ibid. 30