Conceptualizing and Measuring Modern Democracy 13 analyzing ideologically vulnerable, purposive ends like "freedom," they offer modied, procedurally-oriented typologies, e.g. the majoritarian and consensus democracies of Lijphart (1984), to explore democracy and its main variations, or at least sound a stronger caveat to taking the popular usage of the term as a sufciently clear denition. One can't help but wonder why this divide between the proceduralists and the substantivists camps has persisted to current times. There could be a deeper philosophical/methodological divide between those who consider democracy as a method or procedure of governance and those who would insist on its substantive, purpose-oriented content as a primary concern. The debate on the conceptual content and direction of democratic rule can perhaps be recast into the traditional disjunction between fact and value that persists among most social scientists. Procedural fact and valued outcomes relating to democratic polities often divide democracies' energetic explorers. Those emphasizing the method of rule, the procedures and processes of governance, argue that involving democracy scholars in futile debates regarding its alleged sourceauthority and nal ends wind up with no more than ideological contentions; those favoring the substantive outcomes of democratic rule allege that focusing overly much on method does not make enough demands on what democracy and democratic governance ought to bring about. The debate may not be a real one as both method and ends obviously could simultaneously inhere in the concept of democracy and democratic governance. The main obstacle to a more productive, synergistic probe into democratic theory and empirical democratic governance appears to be the uncompromising demands of the procedurally inclined scholars to come up with demonstrably pragmatic, useful studies. As Huntington curtly points out in criticizing those who would worry about values of political freedom in their democratic studies, "Fuzzy norms do not yield useful analysis." (Huntington, 1993:9). Many remain wary about minimalist democracy studies using elections as their most critical variable. Some expressed doubts about the "economicism" – the use of primarily economic analytical tools and subject focuses -- of their democracy studies and found themselves going back to their "philosophical, legal and moral theory" studies to anchor their probes into then emerging democracies. (O'Donnell, 2000) Decades earlier, another theorist had poetically pointed out that even as the procedural or methodic concerns of democracy should not be ignored, democracy nevertheless has its principles and core values. "Within the limits of these, democracy recognizes the legitimacy of whatever ideals or fundamental beliefs – different and even conicting – that the citizens may cherish. It is a political system and a theory in which men may freely pursue their dreams and purposes, and try to convert them into reality through politics. Lacking the certainties of a