Reform and Abolition: The Philippine Party-list System 191 for instance, on the expertise of the technology supplier to manage the automated elections. This point was raised earlier by former Chief Justice Reynato Puno when he asked about the implications on the country's sovereignty in allowing a foreign company to implement election technology thereby virtually taking over the management of the country's sovereign political exercise. What is more alarming, on the whole, is the inltration and control of the PL system by the country's political dynasties. This happened in the context of Congress' failure to accommodate proposed measures to align the Party-list system in favor of the marginalized classes, the election body's overall institutional inefciency, and what could be described as the unforeseen adverse results of the SC's rulings on the Party-list. The net effect of all of these has been to perpetuate the dynastic dominance of Congress and to bring about more injustice to the country's poor and trample upon their constitutionallyenshrined right to better legislative representation. This point warrants a further discussion of how the electoral process favors the perpetuation and resiliency of oligarchic politics in the Philippines albeit with further discussion on the role of the Comelec. Elitism in the electoral system Bourgeois in form but feudalistic in character, elections in the Philippines serve to perpetuate the monopoly of political power by family dynasties. By no means do they serve as an instrument to democratize political power or, ultimately, to ensure that the government represents the sovereign will of the people, hence, to act as the prime engine of people-centered economic growth. There may be institutional requirements that will make the electoral process play its critical role in, so to speak, consolidating democracy in the Philippines. Often mentioned, for instance, are having a mature political party system, an independent and competent election administrator, and a well-informed electorate. This paper holds, however, that although such institutional requirements may be valid the failure of the country's electoral process to meet its democratic objectives lies in other fundamental reasons whose roots may not be addressed in the present generation. The challenge is not only to take stock of these fundamental roots but more importantly, to make sure that such appreciation translates into higher political awareness by the key stakeholders and drivers in the democratization process – the people. Reform is possible only by striking at the structural roots of a societal problem. First, let us take a look at the current spectrum of political dynasties in the country. Based on data from the latest study by the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG),9 election outcomes from the country's congressional