186 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Second Edition Reforming the constitutionally-enshrined Party-list system with the enabling law RA 7941 (1995) became an agenda of Party-list groups led by the emerging progressive bloc in Congress. This reform agenda took shape after the rst few elections held since 1998 for the purpose of voting for nominees to ll up the 20% of seats reserved for the marginalized sector in the House of Representatives. Among the rst issues that triggered the ling of complaints with the Comelec and the Supreme Court (SC) were the accreditation of groups that did not represent marginalized sectors because of their afliation with traditional politicians or with previously elected ofcials, among other reasons. Another reform issue focused on designing a correct and fair formula of proportional representation given the 3-seat cap on winning Party-list groups and on how to ll up the 20% seats reserved for the system. One major challenge facing the Party-list groups in Congress was how to address their fragmentation into minority groups and balance the dominant presence of dynastic politicians whose big number pose a problem to the passage of bills and resolutions led by the Party-list representatives. The reform initiatives over the past 18 years have become the subject of discourse, petitions, as well as legal cases running through turbulent political events. This period saw the ouster of President Joseph E. Estrada in the second EDSA civilian uprising of 2001, the controversial 9-year regime of Gloria M. Arroyo marked by charges of election fraud, scams and plunder, impeachment complaints to unseat the president, and the U.S.-led “war on terror” backed in the Philippines by Arroyo during which progressive Party-list groups became the target of harassment, vilication, and extra-judicial killings by Arroyo's security forces. The pork barrel scams during President Benigno Aquino III's term implicated a number of Party-list congressmen and led to the arrest and investigation of some senators led by former Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada, and Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr. In past six Congresses since the implementation of the Party-list law (11th to 16th), the number of PL representatives who were to occupy at least 50 seats in the lower House, went from just 14 (1998-2001), 16 (2001-2004), 24 (2004-2007), jumping to 55 (2007-2010), 60 (2010-2013), and 56 (2013-2016). The current 17th Congress has 59 PL representatives. The number of winning Party-list groups during the same period (11th to 17th Congress) ranged from 13, 10, 16, 34, 44, 41, and 47, respectively. Curiously, the gradual increase in the number of seats held under the Party-list in the last seven Congresses also saw the growth in the number of representatives with dynastic ties. Thus, the percentage of congressmen with dynastic ties including those who have relatives in other appointive or elective public ofces, whether local or national, was 10% in 1998 or 11th Congress, growing to 21% (15th Congress), 41% (16th Congress), and 47% (17th Congress). With the entry of PL nominees in the lower House, the number of members counted as millionaires or multi-millionaires also increased. The 15th Congress, for instance, had 51 PL members who are millionaires comprising 91% of the total number. Only ve were non-millionaires.1