Elections as an instrument of political control 153 these bodies. Actually, the Compostela and Biliran cases were merely two in a long list of anomalies that attended the 2010 elections. The most intensive independent monitoring of that 2010 poll automation exercise was conducted by the University of the Philippines-based policy studies group CenPEG [Center for People Empowerment in Governance] in a project (Project 30-30) funded by the European Union and the European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights. Covering a two-year period commencing at the start of the automation process in 2008, the study involved a research team made up of social, political, and information technology experts from both the academe and industry. The study quickly attracted the support and cooperation of a broad assemblage of groups from both the private and public sectors and these coalesced into what became the independent citizens' election watchdog Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch). AES Watch was a multi-sector coalition of over 40 groups of industry professionals, academics, concerned citizens' organizations, church groups, lawyers' associations, and national organizations of IT practitioners in the country. In November 2010, CenPEG released its 485-page concluding report (the last of six) on the 2010 polls. The CenPEG report listed numerous facts and occurrences that demonstrated the failure of the automated election system implemented by Chairman Melo's Comelec “to operate properly, securely, and accurately”. Summarizing its ndings based on actual incidents and analyses, CenPEG found: “Mismatched time and date stamps on all PCOS [Precinct Count Optical Scanner] machines; transmission failures; erroneous COCs [Certicates of Canvas] in at least 57 provinces and cities; ballots and CF [compact ash] memory cards delivered manually for canvassing; discovery of the [unauthorized] console port in all machines making the PCOS vulnerable to tampering; erroneous entries of total number of voters and votes cast in the national canvassing center and Congress; near anarchy in the clustered precincts; and, not to forget, the pre-election incidence of defective CF cards.” These “disturbing ndings” were conrmed to have “occurred nationwide” and “were validated again in congressional hearings, investigations, and Project 30-30 post-May 10 case studies”. According to CenPEG, “All of these have tainted the integrity, credibility, and accuracy of the PCOS machines and the election system.” More tellingly, CenPEG accused Comelec of sacricing “the more fundamental imperatives of accuracy, security, transparency, and reliability” in order (presumably) to prioritize “speed”. In this presumed quest for speed – the motivations were probably more sinister and nefarious – CenPEG found that Comelec “practically abdicated its role as the principal Election Manager.” Effectively leaving everything in the hands of “untested” technology supplier Smartmatic eventually led to “removing vital [security] mechanisms,