Local Governments, Civil Society, Democratization, and Development 131 signicant reduction in the revenue effort of local managers, higher revenue efforts shown by rst- and second-class provinces relative to lower-class provinces indicate varying ypaper effects. As such, the poorer provinces (or by extension, cities and municipalities) appear to be more satised with the legally mandated central government dole-out. This is not to say that lower income class LGUs do not have a revenue base. With almost all LGUs covering a signicant area, specically a xed taxable asset that is land, LGUs have been found to be remiss in enforcing a specic tax, the idle land tax. Based on statistics cited by the DOF and DILG, only 5 of the 80 provinces and 8 of the 121 cities have imposed the idle land tax.21 In a recent study, the La Liga Policy Institute cited estimates that anywhere from 1 to 94% of agricultural lands in the country are idle (La Liga Policy Institute 2011). Given the expanse of idle agricultural lands, this can extend to close to 10 million hectares. Thus, the Institute proposed that the LGC provision allowing LGUs to impose tax on such idle lands be implemented, a proposal that has already elicited support from the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) through the issuance of a joint circular22 that mandates the implementation of the Ad-Valorem Tax on Idle Lands. Assuming, however, that LGUs do impose the idle land tax, the revenues to be generated from such tax may be lower than that which the LGU would spend given the statutory ceiling as well as the procedures that LGUs need to follow to collect such taxes. There have been documented cases where LGUs either spent more to collect real property taxes or had to be creative so that they would escape the costly (nancial and political) process of land valuation.23 To some extent, the higher cost of tax collection indicates the organizational constraint confronted by local government units. Organizational limits As noted by Manasan (2009), the inadequacy of tax administration in many LGUs, could be explained by the reality that many of the personnel assigned to the tax division are not technically equipped for their tasks, with very few accountants in their rolls to perform the necessary auditing. Another organizational aw is the limited operationalization of development planning. Planning processes allow local governments to identify the priority needs, determine the resources and programs required to address these needs, and subsequently evaluate the extent of accomplishment of plan targets. In short, the systematic application of development planning enables the LGU to be more responsive. Under the LGC, development planning is also supposed to proceed in a participatory fashion, with development councils established from the barangay to the city/municipal levels. In their 11th Rapid Field Appraisal (RFA), The Asia Foundation (TAF) noted: