Amicus Brief – Human Rights and Climate Change 7. The Supreme Court has also maintained this holistic interpretation of human rights in domestic law, recognizing socio-economic rights as justiciable.20 In Oposa, et al. v. Factoran, Jr. et al., the Supreme Court notably held that the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology ‘unites’ with the right to health (art. II, secs.16 and 15 of the Constitution) imposing ‘the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment’, whereas its ‘denial or violation … by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action’.21 The Oposa decision put the Philippines at the forefront in the movement towards the interpretation of constitutional rights to require substantive environmental protections.22 Subsequent jurisprudence has maintained both the self-executing character of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the correlative obligations to which this right attaches.23 8. In sum, the legislative provisions on the Commission’s mandate and their interpretation in line with established Philippine Supreme Court’s case law leave no doubt over the Commission’s jurisdiction to hear the petition pursuant to each, or any, of its investigation, recommendatory or monitoring functions noted in paragraph 2 above. 1.2. THE SCOPE OF THE COMMISSION’S JURISDICTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9. Numerous respondents suggest that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear complaints over corporations that do not ‘transact business in the Philippines within the meaning of Philippine law’24 and that ‘it is well settled that the jurisdiction of a state is limited only to the confines of its physical boundaries’.25 As this part of the brief will demonstrate, these and similar assertions are simply inaccurate. Contrary to what the respondents allege, it is a well-established principle of international law that a state may exercise prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction over natural or legal persons on its territory or abroad, as long as there is a clear connecting factor between that state and the person or conduct that it seeks to regulate.26 10. As far as jurisdiction in international law is concerned, jurisdiction entails the state legislature’s right to create, amend or repeal legislation (prescriptive jurisdiction), the state’s right to enforce this legislation, for example, by using powers of arrest and investigation (enforcement jurisdiction) and the ability of national courts, tribunals or other bodies exercising judicial functions to hear and decide on matters (adjudicative jurisdiction). States’ prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction are not territorially limited to acts occurring within a state, but States’ enforcement jurisdiction is.27 The respondents’ submissions, however, conflate these different forms of jurisdictions, and, on this basis, reach inaccurate conclusions. For example, Cemex and Shell, selectively cite the 1927 Lotus case judgement,28 arguing that it is ‘well-settled that the jurisdiction of a state is limited only to the confines of its physical boundaries’.29 The respondents refer to the passage where the Permanent Court of International Justice says: Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State…30 But the respondents’ here fail to distinguish between the different forms of jurisdiction. The passage of the Lotus judgement they cite only concerns enforcement jurisdiction. On other forms of jurisdiction, the Lotus judgement says: Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable. This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other States….31 7