(1) Coerced Sex a. Rape From the time of the adoption of the Penal Code (1889) rape was considered a grave crime that infringes a woman’s right to bodily security rather than a minor crime affecting her chastity. It was described initially as a crime that was committed “against her will and without her consent.” (S. 363 prior to 1995 amendment). This definition focused on proof of the woman’s physical resistance, and the accused was acquitted if there were no physical injuries on the man’s body as evidence of rape. The credibility of the woman could be attacked during the prosecution on the basis that she had not resisted. No specific legislation on evidence and procedure in Sri Lanka requires independent evidence to “corroborate” or confirm the victim’s evidence of rape if it is considered reliable. Yet by practice Sri Lankan Courts have been guided by early English Common law and required independent corroboration of her version of the events. (See Annex). The Amendment of 1995 now defines rape in S. 363 as sexual intercourse by a man with a woman “without her consent,” deleting the requirement “against her will.” The 1995 amendment focuses on absence of consent as the central concern of all criminal law. It therefore reinforces the rights of a woman in respect of her sexual and reproductive health and her right to personal decision making in this regard, and her right to physical integrity and protection from unwanted interference with her body. Several specific definitions of rape in the 1995 amendment indicate that there can be absence of consent due to diverse factors (eg. unsoundness of mind, intoxication induced by alcohol or drugs, use of force, threat of detention or intimidation, or putting the victim in fear of hurt or death.) (S.363 (c)(d) and (b) repealed and as amended (1998). We have referred to amendments to provisions on punishment for offences including rape in 2006, indicating that compensation ‘for injuries’ in rape cases includes psychological injury. (Amendments to S. 364 Penal Code Amendment 2006). One explanation to S. 363 on rape states that penetration of a woman’s vagina is adequate evidence of resistance to prove rape. (Explanation (i) Amendment 1995). Another Explanation clarifies that evidence of resistance such as physical injuries to the body is not essential to prove that sexual intercourse took place without consent. (Explanation (ii) Amendment 1995). These changes make it abundantly clear that evidence of resistance is not required to prove rape. They also support the judicial view already taken in some cases that it is unnecessary to require independent corroboration, and it is possible to obtain a conviction on the basis of the woman’s evidence. However unfortunately trial courts sometimes focus on proof of injuries and the evidentiary requirement of independent corroboration. There is no consistent judicial practice that has integrated the reproductive and human rights approach that the 1995 Penal Code Amendment tried to introduce into the criminal law. (See Annex). b. Rape as Torture by Public Officials It is important for trial courts and law enforcement officers to recognize that rape is also considered torture, and a violation of the fundamental human right to freedom from torture guaranteed by Art 11 of the Constitution in a decision of our Supreme Court. (Maradana Rape Case, See Annex torture and the Constitution). Public officials are also liable under Art 11 for inaction, or on the basis of command responsibility. A Non-State actor or private person can be made a respondent to a fundamental rights COMPENDIUM ON LAW, GENDER BASED VIOLENCE AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 15