[120] In Victoria, Australia in the case of Anderson v Blashki [1993]
VR 89 it was held that the standard of proof to be applied by the
coroner in inves�ga�ng a death is the civil standard of the balance
of probabili�es (see also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336).
In the infamous case of Inquest into the death of Azaria Chantel
Loren Chamberlain [2012] NTMC 020, it was held by the High Court
of Australia that in the coronial jurisdic�on, the test applied is a
balance of probabili�es test.
[122] Returning to the issue of the standard of proof applicable in an
inquiry of death, a useful comparison may be made with the
standard applied in preliminary inquiries into cases (namely, capital
offences) triable by the High Court before Chapter XVII, ss 138 151
of the CPC were deleted by Act A908. For purposes of commi�al of
a case for trial in the High Court, reliance used to be placed by the
prosecu�on on the phrase sufficient grounds for commi�ng as
provided for by the former s 140(i) of the CPC. What this meant was
that there must be credible evidence shown by the prosecu�on for
a case to be commi�ed for trial. The standard of proof in a
preliminary inquiry had always been on a standard lower than that
of beyond reasonable doubt. In Public Prosecutor v Puspanathan a/l
Sinnasamy & Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 165, Mohd Hishamudin J (now JCA)
had occasion to say that for the purposes of the preliminary inquiry,
the prosecu�on was only required to adduce sufficient evidence
iden�fying the body of the deceased and was not required to prove
this beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal trial, as opposed to a
mere preliminary inquiry, the standard of proof is higher (see p 169
E F,H I; Teay Wah Cheong v Public Prosecutor [1964] 1 MLJ 21 and
Fazal Din v Public Prosecutor [1949] MLJ 123 dis�nguished).”
70.
Thus, the standard of proof applicable in a Public Inquiry under Sec�on 12 of the
Act is on a balance of probabili�es (that is, the standard or quantum of proof in
a civil case). In essence, this means that the Panel is en�tled to accept and rely
25
PASTOR RAYMOND KOH
himself to the evidence made available to him and at the end of the
day must decide on that evidence alone (see Public Prosecutor v
Shanmugam & Ors [2002] 6 MLJ 562); that a magistrate can only
make a definite finding based on proved facts produced and not on
mere conjectures (see Re Rumie Mahlie, deceased [2007] MLJU 280;
[2007] 10 CLJ 69).