[70] ...the scheme and structure of the interlocking provisions under Chapter XXXII of the CPC mandate a lower standard. I am therefore of the view that the applicable standard should be the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabili�es. 65. In the case of Teoh Meng Kee above, at page 774, it was held by Mah Weng Kwai JCA as follows: “[108] It will be noted that s.328 of the CPC speaks of opinion. The sec�on does not s�pulate what the standard of proof is that has to be applied in an inquiry of death. Although s.328 of the CPC is silent on the standard of proof, of course, it cannot be said that there is no standard to be applied. That would be an unacceptable posi�on in law. I am of the view that all that is required of the magistrate is to arrive at an opinion applying the balance of probabili�es (civil) standard test on an objec�ve basis. There must be sufficient evidence to arrive at an opinion, in par�cular whether the death resulted in any way from or was accelerated by any unlawful act or omission on the part of any other person. STANDARD OF PROOF IN AN INQUIRY OF DEATH [118] The next ques�on of law of utmost importance to be determined in this case is the standard of proof to be applied in an inquiry of death. Both the learned magistrate and the learned High Court judge adopted the beyond reasonable doubt test. With respect, I am of the view that this is an error of law as the correct test to be applied is the civil standard of balance of probabili�es. I say this for the following reasons: (a) as stated earlier, an inquiry of death is not a criminal trial or proceeding. There is no accused person on trial and there is no one to be convicted and sentenced by the court upon a finding that the prosecu�on has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt; 101 AMRI CHE MAT (f) A magistrate Coroner shall not express any opinion on any ma�er un�l the conclusion of the inquest. (g) There is no convic�on or punishment at the end of it. …