AMRI CHE MAT and obfusca�on of what has occurred. This situa�on is very o�en drawn out over �me, prolonging the torment of the vic�m's rela�ves. It cannot therefore be said that a disappearance is, simply, an “instantaneous" act or event; the addi�onal dis�nc�ve element of subsequent failure to account for the whereabouts and fate of the missing person gives rise to a con�nuing situa�on." 57. In the case of Ng Yee Fong & Anor v EW Talalla [1986] 1 MLJ 25, Mohamad Azmi SCJ defined the word “acquiescence” as follows: “… properly used where a person having a right, and seeing another person about to commit or in the course of commi�ng an act infringing upon that right, stands by in such a manner as really to induce the person commi�ng the act, and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being commi�ed; a person so standing by cannot a�erwards be heard to complain of the act (see De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286 314). In that sense the doctrine of acquiescence may be defined as acquiescence under such circumstances that assent may be reasonably inferred from it.” 58. The family and other persons ac�ng on behalf of the family of Amri Che Mat do not have the inves�ga�ve powers of the State to secure evidence on the iden�ty of the person or persons who caused the disappearance in order to prove with precision the culpability of the State. 59. At the conclusion of the Inquiry, if the Panel’s finding is that this case is one of an enforced disappearance, the Panel is empowered under Sec�on 13(2) of the Act to refer it to the relevant authori�es or persons with the necessary recommenda�ons. 60. On the other hand, in the event that the Panel’s finding is that the disappearance is an involuntary disappearance in which the State is not concerned, the Panel similarly has powers under Sec�on 13(2) of the Act to refer the case to relevant authori�es or persons with the necessary recommenda�ons. 98