The Moro Legacy raging in Luzon and the Visayas. The US high command sent a military expeditionary force to Zamboanga and Sulu, afraid that Alvarez would negotiate with the Sultan of Sulu and the other Sultanates of Mindanao, form an alliance and open a new fighting front which the US forces would not be able to counteract. (Had this alliance developed, US efforts to take the Philippines would have been effectively frustrated and the people of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao could have won their struggle for independence, thus finishing the historic task that the Philippine Revolution of 1896 had attempted to accomplish.) To create a wedge, the US negotiated for a temporary peace treaty in the form of the Kiram-Bates Treaty. Sultan Kiram of Sulu was against the treaty and stubbornly delayed the negotiations for several months. He did not attend the negotiations (though he sent his representatives) and only appeared during the final signing of the treaty. Most probably he was in contact with General Alvarez who was also his trusted and appointed Datu for Zamboanga and Basilan. Alvarez was holed up in Basilan at that time. The Americans responded to Kiram’s stubbornness by using the same scare tactics employed by US Admiral Perry to force Japan to sign an unequal treaty. The United States navy positioned their most modern battleships menacingly and showed their devastating power during the negotiations while at the same time promising allowances to the key leaders of the Sulu archipelago. The Bichara, the Muslim leading council, capitulated, forcing Sultan Kiram to finally agree to the treaty. The American negotiators put in sweeteners in the treaty in the form of regular allowances to Muslim leaders. After successfully breaking the backbone of the Philippine revolutionary forces and “pacifying” most of Luzon and the Visayas, the Bates Treaty outlived its usefulness. It was unilaterally abrogated on March 2, 1904. Gen. John Bates would later admit: The Treaty was made at a time when nearly all the state volunteers had been sent home and other troops had not arrived to take their places. It was a critical time, as all the troops were needed in Luzon. The Government could not afford to stir up trouble with the Moros. The Treaty was made as a temporary expedient to avoid trouble. It has served its purpose for three years, and there is now no reason why the treaty, which was but a temporary measure at a critical time, should not be changed in accordance with the conditions. 21