have regard to international instruments either to enforce them directly in monist jurisdictions where this is permitted or to use them as aids in interpreting and applying domestic rules in dualist jurisdictions where direct enforcement is not permitted. The enforcement of ESC rights is hotly contested and is intertwined with the issue of recognition. Rights are often regarded in black and white terms, as being either fully justiciable or simply aspirational. Because economic and social rights are justiciable with difficulty at best, they are often placed in the aspirational category and thus not recognized as “rights”. The justiciability of ESC rights is questioned on the grounds that they are too vague to have clear legal content, too costly to implement and thus too political for judicial decision, and too positive to be amenable to court supervision. These are the reasons why ESC rights are recognized e.g. “to the extent provided by law”. And these are the reasons why both the ICESCR and the European Social Charter were, for so long, monitored through state reporting procedures rather than complaints procedures like their sister treaties, the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights. The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the monitoring body of the ICESCR, has responded to the enforcement critique in a number of ways. One response has been to modify the enforcement mechanisms so that judiciarisation can now be said to be supplementing dialogue. One change was to sharpen the reporting system itself to make it more adversarial in nature. It did this by encouraging the submission of “shadow reports” from national non-governmental organizations and by issuing rather pointed public “Concluding Observations” on the individual national reports. A second response has been to counter the objection of vagueness by issuing a number of documents clarifying the content of rights. In this vein, the Committee has issued General Comments on various rights guaranteed in the ICESCR; it has had Special Rapporteurs named to study particular rights; and it has held “days of general discussion” on individual rights. A third response has been to address justiciability arguments based on cost and positive nature by clarifying the nature of State obligations under the Covenant. In its General Comment No.3, the Committee defined them as comprising obligations to take steps towards realizing the rights (albeit progressively), to avoid any unjustifiable backsliding (i.e. deliberately regressive measures) in their realization, and to assume a minimum core obligation in regard to each right. The Committee has also endorsed a “typology” of State obligations which disaggregates them into (1) the obligation to respect (i.e. to refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals), (2) the obligation to protect (i.e. to protect individuals from interference with their rights by others), and (3) the obligation to fulfill (i.e. to provide the object of the right, such as adequate food or housing etc.). This well-known typology goes some way to responding to objections of justiciability: an obligation to respect is essentially negative in nature and does not require the use of State resources, an obligation to protect might require State action (such as adopting legislation) but does not place undue strain on State resources; it is only the obligation to fulfill that raises the two obligations – costliness and positive nature – most acutely. Another way of phrasing the Committee’s typology is in terms of State roles rather than State obligations. In this way, the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill suggest that the State can play a negative role as perpetrator of a violation of a right, and positive roles as enabler and a provider of the subject of a right. A focus on the roles played by a State emphasizes the implementation of rights. It also provides a framework through which to analyse rights in a disaggregated way. The notion of indivisibility of human rights and their universality make it almost absurd to erect any artificial glass wall between civil and political rights on one hand and the ESC rights on the other. Additionally, this unnecessary and ill-conceived debate creates an environment where in the danger of diluting the significance and immediate nature of the ESC rights looms large. The National Human Rights Commission, Bangladesh (NHRC) deems its statutory obligation to closely monitor and report back to the government on the status of state compliance with international human rights treaties and conventions at least to the extent signed and ratified