Second Annual Report of the National Institution for Human Rights (NIHR) 2014 - Kingdom of Bahrain will be appointed by royal decree for four years, which is renewable for a similar period. This ensures the stability of their mandate for performance of the tasks assigned to them in the promotion and protection of human rights in the Kingdom. SECOND: FULL-TIME MEMBERS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 3. In order to enable the national institutions to undertake their responsibilities in the promotion and protection of human rights, the members of the decision-making body should be appointed in a manner that enhances their independence and ensures the continuation of programs and services of the national institution through full-time appointment of the members. “Paris Principles” do not explicitly provide for the issue of full-time appointment but only state their appointment mechanism to ensure the stability of their mandate51. SCA, on the other hand, believes that the appointment of full-time members would enhance the independence of national institutions from any actual or perceived conflict of interest, and leads to the stability of the appointment of its members, thus contributing to the discharge of their duties continuously and effectively52. 4. By reference to the provisions of Law No. 26 of 2014, it is noted that it does not refer to the fulltime remuneration of any of the members of NIHR Council of Commissioners. Therefore, in line with SCA approach, either the Law should expressly provide that all or some members of NIHR Council of Commissioners should be appointed on full-time basis, or practice requires the need for at least the Chairperson of the Board of Commissioners to be appointed on fulltime basis. THIRD: FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS OF THE DECISION-MAKING BODY OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 5. The independence of national institutions requires the ability of the members of the decisionmaking body to carry out the tasks entrusted to them freely and without restrictions or obstacles. This has been referred to by “Paris Principles”, which state that the national institutions may consider freely all matters which fall within their competence53. Although these Principles do not explicitly refer to functional immunity, the entrenchment of this provision is in the laws establishing these national institutions is essential as a characteristic of their institutional independence. 6. SCA believes that the issue of “functional immunity” is necessary to strengthen the independence of national institutions, consolidate the stability of the mandate of their decisionmaking bodies, and foster their ability to criticize human rights issues and provide their observations on them. SCA points out that such immunity is not absolute, but is constrained within the framework of the mandate granted by the law to its members54. 7. The provisions of Law No. 26 of 2014 adopt the same approach for providing protection to the members of the Council of Commissioners, the decision-making body, to enable them to perform the tasks entrusted to them in the promotion and protection of human rights. Article 9 states that no member may be reproached for his opinions and ideas concerning the issues that fall within NIHR mandates. It further prohibits conducting any investigation with the member 51 “Paris Principles” relating to the Status of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, Clause 3, p. 6. 52 General Observation (2 - 2) Full-time members of a National Human Rights Institution, p. 120. 53 “Paris Principles” relating to the Status of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Methods of operation, Clause a, p. 6. 54 General Observation (2 - 3) Full-time members of a National Human Rights Institution, p. 122. 36