THE IMBROGLIO OF LEGAL CAPACITY IN INDIAN DISABILITY LAW of financial credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily denied of their property.” The Treaty Body in the General Comment asks state parties to replace provisions denying legal capacity in financial matters with procedures, which provide support. In line with its analysis of Article 12, the Treaty Body asks states to replace substitution arrangements, such as guardianship, conservatorship with support. The provisioning of support parallel with substitution is seen as insufficient. To ensure that the supported decision-making is not notional or symbolic, the Treaty Body has provided a set of guidelines on the nature of support. Thus, the support is to be available to all; be based on the will and preference of persons with disabilities; must be provided either free or at nominal cost; the accessing of support should not result in loss of other rights and the providing of support should not be linked to any mental assessments. Henry Shue has defined basic rights to be those rights which must be socially guaranteed to ensure the realisation of all other rights.13 In Part IV of the General Comment, the CRPD Treaty Body has expressly commented on the relationship of the right to legal capacity with other rights of the CRPD and admitted that the denial of legal capacity could severely compromise accessing other rights in the CRPD, including but not limited to the right to access justice (Article 13); freedom from involuntary detention and treatment (Article 14); protection of physical and mental integrity (Article 17) liberty of movement and nationality (Article 18); live independently and in the community (Article 19); freedom of speech and expression (Article 21); right to marry and form a family (Article 23); to vote and stand for elections (Article 29). The above description of the text of the Convention as interpreted by the Treaty Body in the General Comment and its concluding observation shows that the Committee has made an unqualified assertion of the new paradigm of legal capacity.14 International human rights monitoring primarily relies upon naming and shaming to obtain conformity. Even as there are academic writings, which question the binding force of a Treaty Body’s concluding 13 14 Henry Shue, Basic Rights Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, 1980). On the negotiating travails of Article 12 and the reason why the new paradigm of disability rights should be adopted see, Amita Dhanda, “Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future,” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 34 (2007 2006): 429. 35