number of statutes and are relatively disjointed, in reflection of the current nature of the legislative framework. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security primarily has the role of providing independent review of the compliance of intelligence and security agencies with their legal functions, and can receive complaints regarding individual cases. The Commissioner of Security Warrants, a retired High Court judge, is charged with authorising applications for warrants44 under the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 and interception warrants (in conjunction with the Minister) under the GCSB Act45. Parliamentary oversight is provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee46. 58. It is notable that none of these institutions are expressly required to have any consideration of New Zealand’s international human rights obligations, which serves to highlight the absence of the ICCPR Article 17 right to privacy from the NZBORA. The Inspector-General, the oversight mechanism responsible for compliance, is not explicitly required to regularly review operational policy and practice against human rights obligations or consider human rights impact47, although they may consult with a Human Rights Commissioner when carrying out any of their inquiry, complaint and review functions48. The Inspector-General is also required to review the ‘legal compliance” of intelligence and securities agencies, however the statutory language indicates that this review function is limited to domestic law.49 59. Furthermore, the Inspector-General’s complaints inquiry functions are reasonably limited. The Inspector-General does not appear to have any authority to inquire into complaints regarding groups of people or systemic practices (such as racial or ethnic profiling for example), nor do they have jurisdiction to issue remedies to individual complainants. Redress is limited to the issue of a report that is furnished to the Minister and the agency chief executive.50 Complainants have no right of access to that report. Instead, the Inspector-General is merely obliged to notify the complainant of their conclusions in limited terms51. 60. New Zealand’s oversight mechanisms therefore have limitations when it comes to monitoring human rights compliance. The Commission has previously raised 44 And providing authorisation for warrantless surveillance under s 41E(2) Section 15B 46 The Commission supports the establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee with cross-party political membership, see Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, p 13, para 55(a) 47 Section 11(1) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 48 Section 12 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 49 Section 11(1) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 50 ibid s 25 51 ibid 45 Page 91 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR