sort of transparency that would usually apply to a public sector organisation. It is therefore imperative that the public be able to trust that those exercising the powers are doing so only in the way authorised by Parliament. A robust compliance regime, including visibly demanding external reporting and oversight, should provide considerable assurance to the public.” 24 36. A statutory Code of Practice that applies across the intelligence and security sector has the potential to provide a stronger protective mechanism against intrusive practices or “jurisdiction creep” than a policy-level compliance framework. 37. In addition, the Commission agrees with Anderson’s position that arbitrary distinctions should not be drawn between content data and communications data (meta-data). Instead, what is important is that such data may only be accessed pursuant to properly authorised requests, based on clear laws that are subject to independent judicial oversight.25 Rights compliance 38. In recent submissions, the Commission has identified a number of concerns about the potential impact on human rights of the recent tranche of reforms to New Zealand’s intelligence and security laws.26 39. The Commission has accordingly proposed that intelligence and security legislation includes both explicit reference to human rights principles and places an onus on officials to respect human rights in the course of implementing their statutory duties.27 40. This approach reflects international human rights standards articulated in a number of recent UN reports and General Assembly resolutions28. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, for example, has proposed a number of practice standards that include:  That all intelligence services are constituted through publicly available laws that comply with international human rights law29.  That intelligence services are prohibited from undertaking any action that 24 Rebecca Kitteridge, Review of Compliance of the Government Communications Security Bureau para 38, p 20, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Compliance-Review/Review-of-Compliance.pdf 25 A Question of Trust para 13.12-13.14 26 See Human Rights Commission, Reports and related materials on intelligence and security policy, 27 July 2015 27 Human Rights Commission, Briefing to DPMC, para 2.4 28 Such as General Assembly Resolution 68/178 on the Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism and Resolution 67/167 concerning the right to privacy in the digital age 29 A/HRC/14/46, Practice 4, p 7 Page 86 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR