limitations to the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR must be: …sufficiently accessible, clear and precise so that an individual may look to the law and ascertain who is authorized to conduct data surveillance and under what circumstances. The limitation must be necessary for reaching a legitimate aim, as well as in proportion to the aim and the least intrusive option available. 20 31. The principles of necessity and proportionality are therefore crucial human rights concepts21 when considering the powers and jurisdictional scope of our intelligence and securities agencies. 32. The OHCHR suggests that the onus is upon Governments to demonstrate that powers that interfere with individual privacy are both necessary and proportionate to address the specific risk. Without these precepts, the activities of Government intelligence agencies, such as mass surveillance programmes risk arbitrariness, even if they serve a legitimate aim and are vested under an accessible legal regime.22 33. Further to this point, both the ISR Panel and Anderson reinforce “the articulation of enduring principles” as a key component of any intelligence and security regime. The ISR Panel goes on to recommend the development of statutory Codes of Practice, written in plain accessible language, that include details of the technical implementation and application of governing legislation.23 34. The Commission endorses this approach. New Zealand’s disparate legislative framework lacks a coherent set of principles that guide consistent practices or set appropriate parameters of implementation. 35. Rebecca Kitteridge indirectly identified this concern in her March 2013 report Review of Compliance of the Government Communications Security Bureau. Ms Kitteridge recommended the development of a “comprehensive compliance framework” for the GCSB. In coming to this recommendation, Ms Kitteridge observed: “I would argue that GCSB [is at the] high-risk end of the compliance spectrum. Its powerful capabilities and intrusive statutory powers may only be utilised for certain purposes. The necessarily secret nature of its capabilities and activities prevents the 20 ibid para 23, p 8 And are not only limited to the right to privacy under Article 17. For example, Article 12.3 of the ICCPR provides for a restriction on the right to freedom of movement on the grounds of national security; an issue of direct relevance to the amendments to the Passport Act 1992 made under the Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters legislation. In its General Comment No 27 on the right to freedom of movement under Article 12, the UN Human Rights Committee has found that in order to comply with Art 12.3 any such restrictions must be necessary to protect their aim and adhere to the principle of proportionality. See CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 9 paras 11-18 22 A/HRC/27/37 para 25, p 9 23 A Democratic License to Operate, Recommendation 2 21 Page 85 of 93 Human Rights Commission submission to the Human Rights Committee in relation to New Zealand’s 6th periodic review under the ICCPR