152 Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Second Edition center (after the end of voting) and that a transmission coming from the same PCOS machine should have registered the same ID and the same internet address (unless it was moved). This nding should have prompted even the most non-technical person to ask what the heck kind of cockamamie automated election system did Smartmatic and its Comelec cohorts foist on the Filipino people? It should then have been evident to everyone what role anonymous PCOS machines – like the 65 discovered with batches of compact ash (memory) cards in a house in Antipolo City – played in the 2010 elections. It should then also have been crystal clear why Smartmatic/Comelec disabled contract-specied security features – like the mission-critical digital signatures requirement – that would have allowed validation of the source – the machine as well as the operator – of every single election return transmitted electronically. Among the observations of the PhilComSoc experts was: “The audit trail of a PCOS in a certain precinct showed all the tasks that the PCOS performed, including four unsuccessful transmission attempts to the MBOC computers. The last entry in the audit trail was the closing down of the PCOS with no results transmitted. But three hours later, the MBOC audit trail showed that the MBOC computer received, from a different IP address, a successful transmission from the precinct where the PCOS was already closed.” What they said this showed was “that the MBOC computers could – and, in this instance, did – receive elections returns independent of the PCOS assigned to the precinct (since the PCOS of that precinct was already closed).” The PhilComSoc experts added: “[T]here was an instance when the transmission to the MBOC occurred past midday of May 11 or about 29 hours after the polling place rst opened.” What they said this showed was that “the MBOC [computers] can accept transmissions outside the normal range of time allowed for a reasonable delay in the transmission. This long gap in transmission may be used to alter the authentic elections results for pivotal precincts”. The PhilComSoc experts also observed “inconsistent protective counters … (and) error messages in Spanish” that indicated to them that the machines may have been used in a previous election exercise and that “[t]he Filipino taxpayer may have paid brand new prices for second hand PCOS machines”. The technical review of the Biliran evidence by PhilComSoc was prompted by the request of a citizen's movement, Biliran Kawsa. The PhilComSoc report was transmitted by then PhilComSoc Vice-President Edmundo Casiño to the Commission on Elections, the Comelec Advisory Council, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on Automated Elections, the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and the Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms and People's Participation. No action was taken by any of